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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently legislation has been proposed to limit the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts in busing/ abortion,11 and school 
1. See, e.g., S. 1005, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend The Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. 1971, 1975a - 1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976)) (Section 1207 of S. 1005 
deprives all federal courts of jurisdiction to order busing or generally to require any 
changes in the racial composition of public schools). As this article went to press the 
Senate by a vote of 58 to 38 passed S. 951 which invokes both Congress' power over 
jurisdiction of the federal courts under article III and its powers under section 5 of the 
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prayer3 cases. Such proposals are hardly new. On many occa-
sions Congress has been asked to use its regulatory powers over 
the jurisdiction of federal courts to avoid the effects of decisions 
of those courts. • 
Recently, the Chief Counsel to the United States Senate 
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers has suggested restricting 
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. This restriction would be an 
antidote to what he views as the unwarranted imposition of the 
Bill of Rights' restrictions upon state governments pursuant to 
the doctrine of incorporation.11 Completely realized, the Chief 
Counsel's proposal would devolve upon the state courts the 
power to reject conclusively much of the Warren ~ourt's work. 
Is Congress' power to regulate the jurisdiction of federal 
fourteenth amendment to limit the authority of the federal courts to req~:~ire busing as a 
remedy in certain cases. 128 CoNG. REc., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. S. 393-414 (1982). 
2. See, e.g., S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Section 2 denies the lower federal 
courts jurisdiction to declare invalid, or to restrain or enjoin enforcement of, any state 
law regulating or prohibiting abortions). 
3. See, e.g., S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend Chapter 81 of title 28, 
U.S.C.) (Sections 2 and 3 of S. 481 together deprive the Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts of jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of any "State statute, ordinance, rule, 
regulation . . . which relates to voluntary prayers in public schools and public 
buildings"). 
4. For a description of sweeping jurisdictional proposals to avoid federal judicial 
review of state court decisions that were made during the Marshall Court era, see R. 
STEAMER, THE SUPREME CouRT IN CRISIS 44-51 (1971). For a discussion of similar juris-
dictional restrictions that were proposed, enacted and found valid by federal courts dur-
ing the first half of this century, see the discussion of the Norris-La Guardia Act, the 
Emergency Price Control Act, and the Portal to Portal Act in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. 
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL CouRTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 316-24 (2d ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER); for other recent 
proposals, see id. at 360-75; id. at 106-08 (2d ed. Supp. 1981). 
5. The speaker was Dr. James McClellan, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Sub-
committee on Separation of Powers, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. 
The speech was delivered at the annual meeting of the American Judicature Society in 
August 1981. [The text of the speech is on file in the offices of the Wisconsin Law Re-
view.) In his remarks Dr. McClellan attacked the doctrine of incorporation. Broadly de-
fined, the doctrine of incorporation provides that guarantees against state action are im-
plicit in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and resemble the Bill of Rights' 
guarantees against federal action. He argued that the Bill of Rights was designed not 
simply to protect individuals against federal action but to "guarantee to the states that 
the federal government would not usurp the state's power over civil liberties." In addi-
tion he argued that the fourteenth amendment should not be interpreted in a way which 
changes the general independence of the states in matters of civil liberties. That is, the 
doctrine of incorporation is inappropriately applied to the fourteenth amendment. Fi-
nally Dr. McClellan concluded that Congress' powers to make exceptions to and regula-
tions for the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction may be used justifiably to "return 
jurisdiction over civil liberties to the states" and "to restore ... the constitutional bal-
ance provided by the framers." See G. GuNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 476-501 (particularly 488) (10th ed. 1980). 
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courts unlimited? Might the courts themselves enforce limits by 
ruling that some forms of jurisdictional regulation are unconsti~ 
tutional? There is only one case in which a federal court has 
enforced such a limitation on Congress' jurisdictional power: 
United States v. Klein.6 In Klein, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a statute which, like the current proposals mentioned 
above, was an attempt to use jurisdictional regulation to avoid 
the effects of court decisions. 7 Numerous commentators argue 
that Klein places limits on Congress' jurisdictional regulatory 
powers. They are, I believe, correct, but, as we shall see, they 
have also read that case both too broadly and too narrowly. 
The events leading to the constitutional confrontation in 
United States v. Klein were set in motion when Victor Wilson 
marked his six hundred bales of upland cotton "C.S.A." to as~ 
sure their safe transit within the Confederate States of 
America. 8 Pursuant to legislation supported by the Radical 
Republicans,9 Wilson's cotton was seized by Union agents after 
Grant's victory at Vicksburg.10 However, that legislation also 
permitted persons who had remained loyal to the Union to re-
cover property taken by Union agents or to recover its proceeds 
if it had been sold after capture. 11 Wilson claimed he had been 
loyal and, after his death, his administrator brought suit in the 
Court of Claims to recover the proceeds of the Union's sale of 
the cotton.12 The administrator, John A. Klein, succeeded in the 
Court of Claims, which initially found Wilson to have been loyal 
6. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). By regulation of jurisdiction I mean regulation of 
that jurisdiction permitted the federal courts under article III of the Constitution. See 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (reproduced in infra note 141). Occasionally Congress has 
attempted to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts by expanding it beyond the con-
fines of the judicial power as defined in article III. See infra note 141 and accompanying 
text. In such cases the Court has struck down or ignored the regulation. Hodgson v. 
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303-04 (1809). See also District of Columbia v. Eslin, 
183 U.S. 62 (1901); Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864) (Chief Justice 
Taney's opinion for the Court in Gordon originally was lost but ultimately published in 
117 U.S. at 697). 
The regulation with which this article deals is the first sort. It takes two forms: 
either Congress has tried to restrict federal jurisdiction short of the broad grant found in 
article Ill, or Congress has tried to use control of jurisdiction to dictate the decision of a 
case involving the judicial power. 
7. See infra text § II(B)(3). 
8. Record at 5, 15, United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
9. For a description of the Radical Republicans, see H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL 
REPUBLICANS 1-33 (1969). For. a description of the legislation they supported, see infra 
notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
10. Record at 15, Klein. 
11. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
12. Record at 5-6, Klein. 
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in fact. 13 On reopening Klein's case at the government's request, 
the Court of Claims determined that Wilson was, in fact, dis-
loyal. It refused, however, to modify its $125,300 judgment for 
Wilson's estate. Its reason was that, however disloyal in fact, 
Wilson was to be treated as legally loyal because he had received 
a Presidential pardon. 14 
Enraged by the Supreme Court's treatment of the pardoned 
disloyal, the Radical Republicans tried to defeat their claims.111 
The Radicals recognized, however, that judgments like Klein's 
might be seen as constitutionally compelled and, hence, beyond 
the reach of Congress' substantive powers.16 Some Radicals be-
lieved that there were other means of reaching cases like Klein. 17 
The Constitution provided that Congress may regulate the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction.18 Case law suggested that 
Congress had complete power to refuse consent to suits seeking 
money from the federal treasury.19 Based on their interpretation 
of the Constitution and case law, the Radicals successfully spon-
sored a statute which gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to re-
view cases like Klein's, but only to reverse the judgments in such 
cases. 20 The Supreme Court was not given jurisdiction to affirm. 
When the government's appeal invoking the Radical's legis-
latiQn reached the Supreme Court, the Court struck down the 
legislation as violative of separation of powers principles and af-
firmed the judgment against the federal treasury.21 One separa-
tion of powers principle clearly emerges from Chief Justice 
Chase's confusing opinion for the Court: although Congress' 
powers to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts are vast, 
they do not include the power to compel a court to decide cases 
after removing from it the jurisdiction necessary to its deciding 
13. /d., 1-3, 16. 
14. Addition to Record at 2, Klein. 
15. The Radical Republicans were first troubled by the Supreme Court's decision 
in a case similar to Klein: United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870). See 
infra text § II(B)(3). 
16. See infra text § II(B)(3). 
17. Id. 
18. See infra text § IV(A)(2). 
19. See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra text § II(B)(3)(b). The legislation as originally proposed expressly 
required reversal. See infra text accompanying note 88. The word "reversal" was 
dropped but the bill as passed required the Supreme Court to obliterate the judgment of 
a lower court. See infra text accompanying notes 103-09. In effect reversal was required, 
though the statute did not state this in these words. 
21. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
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those cases in a manner consistent with the Constitution. 22 To 
use the Klein episode as an example, Congress there unsuccess-
fully attempted to compel the Supreme Court to decide an ap-
peal, while depriving that Court of the power to determine 
whether the Constitution's pardon provisions compelled the' 
Court to decide in Klein's favor. 
Klein's holding concerning congressional control of federal 
court jurisdiction seems first to have been given proper emphasis 
by Henry Hart. 28 It is a unique holding2• to which Hart has lent 
force. 211 Thus, it is not surprising that Klein has achieved its pre-
sent status as a separation of powers landmark.28 What is sur-
22. See infra text § IV(A)(2). 
23. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1373 (1953). See also HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 4, at 315-16. 
24. See infra text § IV(A)(2). 
25. The bound edition of Shepard's Law Review Citations indicates that Professor 
Hart's article, supra note 23, arguing for limits on Congress' power over the jurisdiction 
of federal courts has been cited thirty-four times by federal courts including four times 
in United States Supreme Court opinions and eighty-five times in law journals. SHEP-
ARD's INC., SHEPARD'S LAW REVIEW CITATIONS 365 (3d ed. 1979). 
26. Klein has been discussed or at least mentioned in the following books and arti-
cles: D. CURRIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 137 (2d ed. 1975); D. CURRIE, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 35 (1976); C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 840, 843-46, 1427 and 1443 
(1971); G. GuNTHER, supra note 5, at 53-57; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 315-16; 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 39-40 (1978); Eisenberg, Congre~sional Au-
thority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L. J. 498, 525-27 (1974); 
Hart, supra note 23 at 1373; Lenoir, Congressional Control Over the Appellate Jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, 5 KAN. L. REv. 16, 39-41 (1956); Merry, Scope of the Su-
preme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53, 55 n.9 
(1962); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 180-81 (1960); Redish and Woods, Congressional Power to 
Control the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a Ne'w 
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 46 n.4 (1975); Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term, 
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981) (discussed in infra note 179); 
Thompson & Pollitt, Congressional Control of Judicial Remedies: President Nixon's 
Proposed Moratorium on "Busing" Orders, 50 N.C.L. REv. 809, 830-32 (1972); Van Al-
styne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 229, 258 n.91 (1973). 
For the variety of uses made of Klein·in the federal courts, see, e.g., United States v. 
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 402-07 (opinion of the Court), 427-31 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (1980) (where the majority and dissent disagree about Klein's implications 
for congressional power to require federal courts to relitigate cases already decided); 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 37 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (stating that Klein 
indicates that there are some tasks Congress cannot impose on a federal court formed 
under article III of the Constitution); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568 (1962) 
(citing Klein as holding that it is unconstitutional for Congress to prescribe to the judici-
ary rules for the decision of pending cases); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1944) 
(reversing the Court of Claims which had held that Klein prohibited Congress from re-
quiring that court to relitigate a case. The Supreme Court left open the possibility that 
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prising is the development among judges and scholars of an un-
critical devotion which resembles a cult of the Klein case. As 
with the object of most cults, the Klein opinion combines the 
clear with the delphic. Chief Justice Chase's excessively broad 
and ambiguous statements for the majority provide the delphic 
elements in Klein. His statements have permitted Klein to be 
viewed as nearly all things to all men. 
Viewed as a source of principles protecting the judiciary 
from the other branches, Klein is often stretched extraordinarily 
beyond its facts by advocates and judges.27 One of the most 
respected works on federal jurisdiction, for example, has errone-
ously attributed to Klein a holding which limits congressional 
power to regulate judicial fact finding.28 With only somewhat 
more plausibility, the Court of Claims in P~pe v. United 
Klein might prohibit congressionally compelled relitigation under other circumstances); 
South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910, 913 n.4 (2d Cir. 
1976) (finding that Klein bears on the validity of congressional withdrawal from all fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to specific federal statutes or 
official action); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 614, 638, 640-41 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (in which 
two judges seem to view Klein as limiting Congress' power to prescribe rules of evidence 
to the federal courts. Those judges seem to disagree over whether Klein contains a hold-
ing which prohibits Congress from changing a law applying to pending appeals). 
For a discussion of Klein's alleged holding as to the regulation of evidence, see infra 
text § IV(B)(1). For a discussion of Klein's possible holding as to the impropriety of 
Congress' changing the law applying to pending appeals, see infra text § IV(B)(2). For 
additional uses of Klein, see National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 
605 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that Klein lends support to the proposition that it would be 
a dereliction of duty for a federal court to fail to determine federal law merely because 
the executive has taken a position on the meaning of that law); Putty v. United States, 
220 F.2d 473, 479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955) (Pope, Cir. J., concurring 
specially) (where Circuit Judge Pope strikes down a federal statute conferring jurisdic-
tion on a federal trial court but withholding jurisdiction from the court to dispose of the 
case in certain ways); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 262 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948) (where, in distinguishing Klein, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals suggests that Klein may prohibit some varieties of congressional revi-
sion of federal courts' judgments); United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (D. 
Md. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 
(1979) (where in an alternative holding, citing _Klein, the district court strikes down the 
Speedy Trial Act's time limitations as an unconstitutional interference with purely judi-
cial functions); Norwich & Worcester R.R. Co. v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 
(Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1976) (distinguishing Klein); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 
243 F. Supp. 957, 977-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (1967), cert. denied, 390 
U.S. 956 (1968) (rejecting the proposition that Klein forbids Congress from making new 
laws to apply to cases in trial court on remand). 
27. In addition to the cases and commentary discussed in the text accompanying 
infra notes 28-36, compare the analysis of Klein made in section IV of this article. with 
the opinions in Carlson, Glidden, South Windsor, Butenko, and Battaglia discuased in 
supra note 26. 
28. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 315-16. 
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States19 struck down an act of Congress as inconsistent with 
principles established by Klein. Though the actual decision in 
Pope is quite limited,80 the Court of Claims in dicta suggested 
that Klein might prohibit Congress from requiring the Court of 
Claims to relitigate a case originally decided in favor of the gov-
ernment. 81 Pope was ultimately reversed. 91 Nearly half a century 
later, however, in United States u. Sioux Nation of Indians,88 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, revived the Pope Court of 
Claims' view. He urged that Klein does indeed prohibit Congress 
from mandating relitigation .under circumstances similar to 
those in Pope.84 
Recently one federal judge cited Klein in a decision which 
held that the Speedy Trial Act is an unconstitutional intrusion 
into a purely judicial realm. sa Another federal judge cited Klein 
in noting that· the executive branch's interpretation of the law 
does not bind the federal courts. 86 Neither of these results was 
required by the holding in Klein for these cases present facts 
quite different from those before the Chase Court in 1872.87 
Klein is, however, generally supportive of them in that it estab-
lishes some protection from interbranch intrusion for the federal 
judiciary. 
I will demonstrate that there are at least two identifiable 
29. 100 Ct. Cl. 375, 375-76, rev'd, 323 U.S. 1 (1944). 
30. The actual ground for the decision is that Klein prohibita Congress from re-
quiring a court to decide a case while at the same time severely restricting the possible 
judicial responses. 100 Ct. Cl. at 380-82. 
31. Id. at 382. The Court says that Klein's prohibition of a congressionally-com-
pelled result in a pending case "could be applied with even greater emphasis to a legisla-
tive direction to a court which has already heard and decided a case, to hear it again and 
decide it differently." /d. at 382 (emphasis added). In reversing the Court of Claims deci-
sion, the Supreme Court in Pope v. United States left open the poBBibility that Klein 
might prohibit legislation only slightly different from that which it approved. 
32. On review, the Supreme Court held that the act of Congress under considera-
tion did not conflict with the Constitution as interpreted in Klein. 323 U.S. at 8-14. It 
did so, however, by determining that Congress had created a new cause of action and 
thus had required litigation of a new claim, not relitigation of an old one. Id. at 9. The 
Court left open the possibility that an act of Congress actually requiring relitigation 
would run afoul of the "principles announced in Klein." Id. at 8-9. 
33. 448 u.s. 371 (1980). 
34. Id. at 428-31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist states that the Su-
preme Court in Pope decided that the Constitution prohibited relitigation. /d. at 428. In 
fact Pope clearly left the issue open. 323 U.S. at 8-9. 
35. United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1109-10 (D. Md. 1977) (alternative 
holding), aff'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 
(1979). 
36. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 605 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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holdings in Klein. The first holding involves a narrow but im-
portant limitation on congressional power to control the jurisdic-. 
tion of federal courts. 88 The second holding has been overlooked 
by the many commentators on Klein. Klein holds that there are 
limits upon Congress' power to invoke the sovereign immunity 
privilege on behalf of the United States. Indeed, Klein is the 
only case in our constitutional history so to hold. Below I will 
discuss in detail Klein's sovereign immunity holding and its cur-
rent relevance. . 
I will also address other holdings which have been attrib-
uted to Klein. I will demonstrate that, despite an important 
statement to the contrary, Klein contains no holding limiting 
congressional regulation of judicial fact finding.89 I will then con-
sider Klein's possible relevance to the existence of a congres-
sional power to compel relitigation of cases otherwise finally de-
cided by the federal courts-in particular, Klein's relevance to 
the Supreme Court's 1980 Sioux Nation case.40 I will show that 
Klein cannot be seen as speaking to the issues involved in Sioux 
Nation.U Finally, I will consider Klein's bearing upon the long 
debate over the status of the Court of Claims and I will show 
that the Klein opinion and ultimate congressional acquiesence 
in the payment of Klein's judgment suggest that the Court of 
Claims was, by the early 1870's, viewed as a full constitutional 
court.42 
The significance of Klein's principles together with the fre-
quent use made of Klein in cases and commentary testify to its 
importance. The record should be clear, however, as to what re-
ally happened when Congress attempted to use the Supreme 
Court as a puppet. 
II. Klein's FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
A. The Facts in Klein and the Court of Claims Decisions 
Shortly before the capture of Wilson's cotton, the third of a 
series of federal statutes dealing with confederate war property 
became law. This measure, the Abandoned Property Collection 
Act (hereinafter referred to as the 1863 Act)48 permitted Trea-
38. See infra text § IV(A)(2). 
39. See infra text § IV(B)(l). 
40. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). See infra text § IV(B)(2). 
41. See infra text § IV(B)(2)(b)(3). 
42. See infra text § IV(C). 
43. The relevant portiops of that measure read: 
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sury agents to receive and collect all property captured or aban-
doned as the Union forces advanced within the areas in rebel-
lion, to sell it and to pay the proceeds into the United States' 
Treasury. The act further provided that any loyal owner whose 
property was abandoned or captured could recover compensa-
tion for the same within two years upon proof "that he has never 
given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion.""" Pursuant to 
the 1863 Act federal officers sold Wilson's cotton and paid the 
net proceeds, $125,300, into the United States Treasury. 
Klein's suit in the Court of Claims on behalf of Wilson's 
· And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of the. Treasury . . . shall . . . cause 
a book or books of account to be kept, showing from whom such property was re-
ceived, the cost of transportation, and proceeds of the sale thereof. And any person 
claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or captured property may, 
at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim 
to the proceeds thereof in the court of claims; and on proof to the satisfaction of 
said court of his ownership of said property, of his right to the proceeds thereof, and 
that he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, to receive the 
residue of such proceeds .... 
The Abandoned Property Collection Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820 (1863) (second em-
phasis added) [hereinafter referred to as the 1863 Act]. 
The first of three statutes, Act of August 6, 1861, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319 (1861), dealt 
only with property which was devoted to war use with the consent of the owner. It was 
not implicated in Klein. 
The second confiscation act was not invoked by the government as justification for 
its actions leading to Klein's suit. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, §§ 5-14, 12 Stat. 589 
(1862) [hereinafter referred to as the 1862 Act]. It was, however, at least tangentially 
involved in Klein. After providing for the confiscation of property of high level officials 
of the Confederacy, the 1862 Act tried to induce allegiance to the Union among a sepa-
rate class of persons-those within the states and territories in rebellion who partici-
pated in or aided or abetted the rebellion or who would do so in the future. The Presi-
dent was permitted to trigger the confiscation scheme by giving a public warning and 
proclamation to this separate class of rebels and aiders and abetters. !d. at§ 6. Any such 
person not ceasing such wrongful acts within sixty days of the warning was subject to 
having his property condemned by the United States in an in rem proceeding. Id. at §§ 
6-7. Although the property confiscated in Klein arguably might have been condemned in 
such an in rem proceeding, such a proceeding was never brought against Wilson by the 
government. As a consequence, this portion of the 1862 Act has no relevance to Klein's 
case as possible justification of the government's position and, indeed, it was never in-
voked by the government. 
Klein, on the other hand, did involve a separate provision of the 1862 Act-that 
which permitted the President to pardon certain persons who "participated in the . . . 
rebellion": 
And be it further enacted, That the President is hereby authorized, at any time 
hereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in the 
existing rebellion in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such ex-
ceptions and at such time and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the 
public welfare. 
Id. at § 13; 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 139. 
44. The Abandoned Property Collection Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820 (1863). See 
supra note 43. 
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estate was initially successful,.u apparently for the simplest of 
reasons: Wilson was found to have given no aid or comfort to the 
rebellion and therefore to be entitled to compensation under the 
1863 Act's proviso to that effect. 46 While the Court of Claims 
mentioned that a presidential pardon was granted to Wilson in 
1862, its decision in Klein's favor apparently rested upon Wil-
son's loyalty in fact.47 On May 26, 1869, after finding that Wil-
son was in fact loyal, the Court of Claims awarded Klein, as Wil-
son's administrator, judgment for $125,300.48 
The government appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. In October 1869, while its appeal was pending, the gov-
ernment moved, in the Court of Claims, to "open up" Klein's 
judgment. 49 Apparently as a result of a recent discovery by the 
government, the Court of Claims found that Wilson had, in Au-
gust of 1862, become a surety on the bonds of two Confederate 
officers.110 These facts were conceded by Klein in a stipulation.111 
The Court of Claims once again noted that Wilson had received 
a pardon; indeed he had received it after ·becoming a surety in 
August of 1862.111 The Court of Claims next held that Wilson's 
undisputed suretyship (assuming that it constituted disloyalty 
under the law) was ultimately irrelevant to his right to recover.118 
The Court's reason was that Wilson's subsequent pardon re-
moved the consequences of any disloyalty. 114 In so holding, the 
Court of Claims departed from its previously announced posi-
tion on the effect of a pardon upon rights under the 1863 Act.116 
45. Wilson v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 559, 567 (1868) (finding 5), modified, 7 Ct. Cl. 
vii (1871), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
46. Record at 16, Klein. 
47. The court's mention of the pardon is contained in its summary of the United 
States' argument and not in its listing of facts which it found relevant to its decision. I d. 
48. Id. at 14. 
49. Addition to Record at 1. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 2. The court stated that the finding of Wilson's suretyship was "by the 
consent of the parties." See also the reference to the Supreme Court opinion in Klein as 
reported in the Court of Claims Reporter, 7 Ct. Cl. at 241 n.*. 
52. Addition to Record at 1-2. 
53. ld. at 2. 
54. Id. 
55. Pargoud v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 337, 341-44 (1868), rev'd., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
156 (1872). Pargoud was Klein's companion case in the Supreme Court. See C. FAIRMAN, 
supra note 26, at 844. When Klein was originally decided in the Court of Claims in 1869 
the Pargoud precedent was still controlling. Hence, had the court been presented with 
facts indicating Wilson had been disloyal in fact and pardoned, presumably it would 
have denied his claim. The only plausible explanation for the Court of Claims, on rehear-
ing, finding that Wilson's pardon excused disloyalty is the decision in United States v. 
Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870). 
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B. Other Events Framing the Klein Decision in the Supreme 
Court 
1. ISSUES IN KLEIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COURT OF CLAIMS' 
REFUSAL TO OPEN KLEIN'S JUDGMENT 
Two intervening events-first, the Supreme Court's decision 
in United States v. Padelford66 and then the Congressional re-
sponse to that decision67-shaped the Supreme Court's Klein 
decision. In the absence of both of those events there is a remote 
chance that the Court of Claims' decision might have been af-
firmed on the ground that serving as a surety for a Confederate 
officer did not constitute disloyalty within any relevant act of 
Congress. 66 If there had been no legislative response to 
Padelford, Klein almost certainly would have succeeded on the 
ground that the statutes themselves viewed either loyalty-in-fact 
or pardon-conferred-loyalty as a sufficient ground for compensa-
tion. 69 As will become apparent, Padelford and the subsequent 
Act of Congress foreclosed these two possible dispositions of 
Klein. 
After Padelford was decided and after Congress had acted, 
it was clear that actions like Klein's were to be characterized as 
disloyal. It was also clear that Congress intended to exclude the 
pardoned disloyal from benefits under the 1863 Act. The issue 
then became the constitutionality of such an exclusion.60 This 
Padelford construed the 1863 Act to include the pardoned disloyal within the class 
of those to be compensated. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 543; see infra notes 70-71 and accompa-
nying text. Padelford was decided by the Supreme Court on April 20, and announced on 
April 30, 1870. Klein's rehearing in the Court of Claims was concluded later. See Supple-
mental Finding's of the Court of Claims 1-2, Klein. 
56. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870). 
57. See infra text § II(B)(3). 
58. This possibility was at best remote even before the Supreme Court's decision in 
Padelford. The Court of Claims did not view the claimant's suretyship as an obstacle 
apparently because the claimant had been indirectly coerced. Padelford v. United States, 
4 Ct. Cl. 316, 323-27 (1868). See also Stark v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 280 (1868). The 
possibility of a similar disposition of Klein, if it ever existed, was foreclosed by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Padelford which seemed to reject such indirect coercion as a 
matter of law. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 539. Padelford was the first Supreme Court case to 
pass on such suretyship as disloyalty. As a result, it is fair to say Padelford settled the 
matter. 
59. This was Padelford's holding concerning the 1863 Act and an Act of June 25, 
1868, ch. 71, 15 Stat. 75 (1868) [hereinafter referred to as the 1868 Act]. See infra notes 
71-74 and accompanying text. 
60. Despite making it clear beyond doubt that acts like Wilson's were disloyal 
within the meaning of the 1863 and 1868 Acts, the Supreme Court in Padelford held that 
under the 1870 Act a pardon excused such disloyal conduct. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 542-43; 
see infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. Those entitled to recover under those Acts 
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issue will be referred to as the "Exclusion Issue." Because Con-
gress chose to exclude pardons by means of a restriction of fed-
eral court jurisdiction, the constitutional issues raised were not 
limited to the Exclusion Issue-the validity of a straightforward 
exclusion of pardonees. Issues regarding the extent of Congress' 
legitimate power over the jurisdiction of federal courts, and par-
ticularly over suits against the United States were also raised. 
The question was whether these congressional powers would 
support an otherwise unjustified exclusion of pardonees from 
benefits under the 1863 Act. 61 
2. THE PADELFORD DECISION 
During the pendency of the government's appeal from the 
Court of Claims initial decision in Klein and before the rehear-
ing, the Supreme Court skirted the Exclusion Issue in Padelford 
whose significant facts were very similar to those in Klein.61 
Padelford narrowed the issues which might have been presented 
in Klein63 and prefigured the non-jurisdictional Exclusion Issue 
ultimately decided.64 The claimant in Padelford had had prop-
erty seized pursuant to the 1863 Act.66 Like Wilson, Padelford 
voluntarily had become a surety upon the official bonds of of-
ficers of the rebel army.66 After becoming a surety on such 
were both the innocent-in-fact and the pardoned disloyal who were legally innocent. 
Thus if there had been no further legislation after the Supreme Court's decision in 
Padelford, Klein would have recovered under the prevailing interpretation of the ex-
isting statutes. There was, however, one other remote possibility. The Supreme Court 
might have read the 1863 and 1868 Acts as distinguishing between Wilson, who received 
his pardon only after his property was seized, and Padelford who was pardoned before 
seizure; it declined to do so. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
61. See infra text § IV(A). 
62. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870). Wilson (on behalf of 
whose estate Klein sued) and Padelford each received their pardons after the alleged act 
of disloyalty. However, the seizure of Wilson's cotton came before his pardon while that 
of Padelford's came after his pardon. Compare United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
128, 142-43, 150 (1872) with United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 532-34 
(1870). 
This distinction was not significant because the Court in Klein did not think that 
the government's seizure of property under the 1863 Act divested the original owner of 
title or its proceeds. In the Court's view, the government became a trustee for the origi-
nal owner. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 142. Aa a consequence, Wilson, like Padelford, 
was pardoned while still the owner of the cotton or its proceeds. 
63. Padelford concluded in strong dictum that voluntarily becoming surety on the 
official bonds of Confederate officers constitutes giving aid and comfort to the rebellion 
within the meaning of the 1863 Act. Padelford at 539. 
64. See infra text § IV(A)(1). 
65. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 531-34, 537, 540. See supra note 43. 
66. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 533, 539. 
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bonds, Padelford took the oath of loyalty prescribed in Lincoln's 
amnesty proclamation of December 8, 1863.87 Still later, 
Padelford's cotton was seized by union forces.88 
The Supreme Court in Padelford concluded that the act of 
voluntarily becoming a surety upon a rebel officer's official bond 
was one which "gave comfort" within the meaning of the 1863 
Act.69 How then was Padelford-guilty-in-fact but later 
pardoned-to be treated by the Supreme Court under the acts 
of Congress and the Constitution? The Court avoided constitu-
tional issues. It read the 1863 Act's provision for payment to in-
nocents in conjunction with the earlier legislation which invited 
a blanket presidential pardon, by proclamation, of all who swore 
an oath of future loyalty. 70 The Court, in effect, held that the 
1863 Act's reference to those who never "gave aid or comfort" 
was intended by Congress to include both those who in fact were 
loyal and the pardoned guilty who were loyal in the eyes of the 
law. 71 In addition, the Court seemed to ignore the purpose of an 
act of 1868,72 which required "affirmative proof'' of loyalty in 
1863 Act claims cases. 78 The Court held that the 1868 Act was 
not intended to change the nature of proof required by the ear-
lier legislation. 74 In effect, therefore, the Court held that the 
1868 Act had not been intended to prescribe different rules for, 
67. /d. at 539. 
68. /d. at 539, 541. 
69. /d. at 539. 
70. /d. at 542-43. 
71. /d. at 543. The Court did not deal with the 1863 Act as if it intended to deny 
compensation to guilty pardonees. If it had so read the act, the Court would have had to 
decide its constitutionality. Because the Court does not indicate that it was striking 
down the 1863 Act, it must be presumed it did not. Since Padelford recovered the Court 
must have read that act as permitting the pardoned disloyal to recover. 
72. For the text of the 1868 Act, see infra note 74. 
73. It was certainly the view of some Radical Republicans that the Court had ig-
nored their purpose. See CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3809-10 (1870) (statement of 
Senator Drake). \ 
74. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 538. The earlier legislation was the 1863 Act. Section 3 of 
the 1868 Act reads: 
That whenever it shall be material in any suit or claim before any court to 
ascertain whether any person did or did not give any aid or comfort to the late 
rebellion, the claimant or party asserting the loyalty of any such person to the 
United States during such rebellion, shall be required to prove affirmatively that 
such person did, during said rebellion, consistently adhere to the United States, and 
did give no aid or comfort to persons engaged in said rebellion; and the voluntary 
residence of any such person in any place where, at any time during such residence, 
the rebel force or organization held sway, shall be prima facie evidence that such 
person did give aid and comfort to said rebellion and to the persons engaged 
therein. 
Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 3, 15 Stat. 75 (1868). 
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those truly innocent and those merely pardoned. The Court's 
analysis suggested that legislation excluding the latter class from 
compensation might have been unconstitutional.711 
As demonstrated in the next section, by the time of the 
Klein decision, several years after Padelford, the intent of Con-
gress to exclude people in· Klein's position from the class enti-
tled to compensation under the 1863 Act was expressed unmis-
takably. As a result, the Exclusion Issue along with new 
constitutional-jurisdictional questions pressed the Court for an 
answer. 
3. LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO CHANGE THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN 
PADELFORD AND THE RESULT IN KLEIN AND OTHER PENDING CASES. 
a. Senator Drake's proposal 
Commerce in cotton was a major source of revenue for the 
75. The majority's statements taken together suggest that its construction of the 
1863 and 1868 Acts was necessary to avoid a constitutional issue. In passing the series of 
measures which included the 1863 Act, Congress invited a presidential blanket pardon of 
persons who participated in the rebellion. After noting this fact, Chief Justice Chase 
stated, "[t]hat the President had power, if not otherwise yet with the sanction of Con-
gress, to grant a general conditional pardon, has not been seriously questioned .... " 76 
U.S. (9 Wall.) at 542 (emphasis added). Chase then goes on to note, quoting from Ex 
Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866), "[t]hat in the eye of the law the 
[pardoned] offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence." 76 U.S. (9 
Wall.) at 542. Presumably the law in whose eye an offender is innocent is the constitu-
tional law of pardons. The issue raised in the first quote is apparently whether a Presi-
dent can issue a blanket, as opposed to an individual, pardon without congressional per-
mission. Chase, however, does not seem to suggest that congressional permission can be 
withdrawn with respect to pardons issued while the permission is in force. 
Most convincingly, in response to the claim that Padelford was without a remedy, 
Chase stated: 
The sufficient answer ... is that after the pardon no offence connected with the . 
rebellion can be imputed to him. If, in other respects, the petitioner made the proof 
which, under the act, entitled him to a decree for the proceeds of his property, the 
law makes the proof of pardon a complete substitute for proof that he gave no aid 
or comfort to the rebellion. A different construction would, as it seems to us, defeat 
the manifest intent of the [President's pardon] proclamation and of the act of Con-
gress which authorized it. 
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 543. Which law makes the pardon a complete substitute? Is it the 
Constitution or only the acts of Congress or is it both? Padelford does not answer these 
questions, not even in dictum. 
Because the Court does not indicate that it was striking down the 1863 Act it must 
be presumed it did not. Because Padelford recovered, the Court must have read that act 
. as permitting the pardoned disloyal to recqver. It is, however, fair to say that the 
Padelford Court recognizes that more than the acts of Congress potentially bear on the 
rights of pardonees. Cf. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), cited in 
Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 542. 
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Confederacy.76 Consequently, it is not surprising that the Radi-
cal Republicans77 behaved vindictively toward the wealthy 
planters who financed the rebellion but who hedged their bets 
by taking the oath necessary to receive Lincoln's blanket par-
don. 78 For these reasons, the Radicals in Congress were dis-
pleased with the Padelford decision. 79 Furthermore, they felt the 
Supreme Court had resorted to an interpretation of the 1863 
and 1868 Acts contrary to Congress' clear intent to prohibit the 
Court of Claims from compensating the disloyal who were subse-
quently pardoned.80 Senator Drake,81 holding a copy of the 
Padelford decision before the Senate, offered a stinging denunci-
ation of the Supreme Court and proposed curative legislation.81 
As originally proposed, his bill made no reference to the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.83 
76. Early in the Civil War the Confederacy sought to create a cotton shortage in 
order to coerce European support. F. OwsLEY, KING Co'M'ON DIPLOMACY 23-86 (2d ed. 
1959). Later in the war, when other resources were depleted, the Confederacy began to 
sell its cotton. /d. at 361-93. 
77. See H. TREFOUSSE, supra note 9, at 1-33. 
78. During the Senate debates on the legislation ultimately struck down in Klein, 
Senator Edmunds, a Republican of Vermont, related to his colleagues a story of one such 
prominent person who, after pardon, indiscretely committed his true feelings in a corre-
spondence. The letter read: 
By availing myself of ... President Lincoln's proclamation of 8th December, 
1863, ... I could . . . preserve all my property to myself, ... and I could, when-
ever I pleased, expatriate myself from Yankee dominion and vicinity . . . . 
If I cannot serve the confederacy by the course I have adopted I can at least 
defeat the Federal Treasury in acquiring all my property for its advantage, which I 
prefer to make myself a beggar and a dunderhead at my time of life, and if I may 
not thereby give active and direct aid to the better cause, it will be in some degree, 
at least, an indirect benefit, by diverting so much from its enemies. 
CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3811 (1870). 
79. /d. at 3810 (statement by Senator Drake); id. at 3816 (statement of Senator 
Trumbull identifying the case as Padelford). See supra text § II(B)(2). 
80. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3810 (1870). See also id. at 3816 (statement 
of Senator Trumbull). 
81. 5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 425 (A. Johnson & D. Malone, eds. 
1930); U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFF., BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 
1774-1971, 879 (1971); H. Trefousse, supra note 9, at xiv. 
82. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3809-10 (1870). 
83. H.R. 974, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1870); CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3809 
(1870). The bill as originally proposed did not contain the word "jurisdiction." It did 
provide that a pardon shall not be used to establish "standing" in the Court of Claims. It 
also provided that if it is established that a claimant has received a pardon reciting his 
guilt and did not protest innocence, the Court of Claims shall dismiss his claim under 
the 1863 Act. /d. Perhaps these features were designed to deprive the Court of Claims of 
jurisdiction under the circumstances mentioned. The proposal said nothing about the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. That Court was required to reverse Court of 
Claims' judgments rendered in favor of the pardoned guilty before passage of the bill. In 
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The bill, in its original form, purported to do several things 
relevant to this article. First, it would have made evidence of a 
pardon inadmissible, in the Court of Claims, in support of 
claims for the proceeds of abandoned or captured property.8" 
Second, evidence of pardons, with some exceptions, would have 
been admissible against a pardoned claimant.811 Indeed, receipt 
of a pardon would be conclusive of disloyalty and consequently 
an absolute obstacle to recovery of property.86 An exception was 
recognized for those who professed innocence, upon receiving 
the pardon, despite its recital of their guilt.87 Such protesting 
pardonees were free to prove their innocence in fact just as if 
they had received no pardon. With these first two provisions, the 
Radicals sought to control the result in cases not yet decided by 
the Court of Claims. Third, the bill dealt with cases like 
Klein-those already decided in favor of the claimant in the 
Court of Claims, but still pending before the Supreme Court. 
Such cases were, under Drake's proposal, to be "reversed" by 
the Supreme Court if the Court of Claims' judgment was based 
upon a pardon. 88 Presumably there would then be a remand but 
the. Court of Claims would be bound by the first two features of 
the bill. 89 As a result, the lower court, on remand, would be re-
quired to presume conclusively the disloyalty of the pardoned 
claimant. In short, on remand the pardoned claimant would lose. 
As a consequence, if Drake's amendment had been enacted 
in its original form, the significant issue before the Supreme 
Court in Klein would have been whether Congress has the sub-
stantive power under the Constitution to discriminate, in paying 
compensation, between those in fact innocent and those guilty in 
fact, but claiming legal innocence via a pardon. If Congress had 
such power the Supreme Court would have been required to re-
verse the Court of Claims' decision. If not, the Supreme Court 
would have affirmed it. 
the evening session of the day he introduced his bill, Drake amended it to include the 
first jurisdictional language. /d. at 3816. This language seems to affect only the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Claims in cases of claims by pardonees who failed to protest inno-
cence. The language affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was later inserted at 
Senator Edmunds' request. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. Drake's bill 
appears to have been drafted by one Judge Hale who was counsel to the government in 
the cotton cases. Id. at 3820. 
84. ld. at 3809. 
85. ld. 
86. ld. 
87. ld. 
88. ld. 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88 for a description of the features. 
HeinOnline -- 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1206 1981
1206 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
b. Debate on Drake's proposal 
The Democrats responded to Drake's proposal by arguing 
that it was an unconstitutional encroachment on the President's 
pardon power.90 Drake countered, arguing that his proposal 
"simply provided a rule of evidence for the Court of Claims."91 
In rejoinder, Saulsbury, a Democrat, correctly pointed out that, 
although evidentiary in form, Drake's proposal was substantive 
in effect: to render ·a pardon inadmissible in a court of law is to 
deprive it of certain legal effects. 92 
The most interesting debate on Drake's proposal took place 
among the Republicans themselves, some of whom disagreed 
about the appropriate means to a mutually desired end. Senator 
Trumbull, a Republican from Illinois,93 was angry about the Su-
preme Court's apparent disregard of Congress' intent, but 
seemed to feel that sovereign immunity would be an adequate 
means of undoing Padelford as effective precedent: 
[T]he action of Congress has been based upon [the] under-
standing, that we would not pay the claims of disloyal men in 
the rebel States. . . . we have been particular to require that 
the party bringing his claim in [the Court of Claims] must es-
tablish his loyalty, and establish it affirmatively .... 
. . . I think it is entirely competent for Congress to refuse 
to let anybody sue the Government in any court, and let every 
claimant come to Congress and present his claim, and then we 
pay it or not, as we see proper. But Congress, out of liberality 
90. The right to grant a pardon is a constitutional right vested in the President of 
the United States .... The constitutional pardon there vested in the President 
was a pardon having the quality of wiping out any stain; in other words, of making 
the man a new man; so that to have called a man, after he had been pardoned, a 
traitor was actionable at law, and damages could be recovered in a court of justice 
.... Now, the effect of the amendment of the Senator from Missouri would be 
that the Constitution could not be pleaded, because when you plead a constitutional 
pardon you plead in effect the Constitution; and you propose to provide by an act of 
Congress that ·it shall not be pleaded or given in evidence. 
Co~G. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3813 (1870) (statement of Senator Salisbury). 
91. My friend from Delaware is too good a lawyer not to recognize the mistake he 
has fallen into . . . . This amendment does not propose in any way whatever to 
pass upon the intrinsic effect of a pardon or amnesty; but simply lays down a rule of 
evidence for the Court of Claims. The question is, who may maintain a suit in the 
Court of Claims against the United States? This amendment simply says that a 
pardon or amnesty shall not be evidence in that ~ourt of a right to maintain an 
action there. 
ld. (statement of Senator Drake). 
92. ld. at 3813-14. 
93. According to at least one historian, Trumbull was on the fringe of the radical 
camp. H. TREFOUSSE, supra note 9, at 330. 
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to claimants, and to give them an opportunity to present their 
claims, has organized a Court of Claims. We need not have or-
ganized it. We could abolish the court to-morrow [sic]. We can 
give it just such jurisdiction as we please. 84 
Trumbull proposed that the Radicals' purpose could be accom-. 
plished by striking all of Drake's proposed amendment except 
that portion which proscribed use of a pardon to establish inno-
cence in the Court of Claims. 96 
The main objection to Trumbull's proposal was that it was 
not clear that it would affect cases, like Klein, which were pend-
ing before the Supreme Court and in which judgment had al-
ready been rendered against the government by the Court of 
Claims.•• Drake's proposal clearly would have affected such 
cases by requiring the Supreme Court to reverse the lower 
court. 87 It was this means rather than the end itself to which 
Trumbull objected: 
I do not think it is proper to say that the Supreme Court shall 
reverse the judgment . . . . 
. . . I think the proper way is to direct the court· not to 
entertain jurisdiction of these cases. 88 
A fellow Republican suggested that Trumbull's proposal would 
have had the unintended effect of allowing any extant Court of 
Claims judgment to stand. 99 
To meet this difficulty, Senator Edmunds proposed the de-
vice which ultimately became part of the law.100 He suggested 
that instead of requiring the Supreme Court to "reverse such 
judgment," Congress should provide that the Supreme Court 
"[shall] have no further jurisdiction thereof, and shall dismiss 
the cause for want of jurisdiction. "101 The obvious objection was 
made by one Republican senator who asked whether this word-
ing would do more than deprive the Surpeme Court of appellate 
94. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3816 (1870). 
95. ld. 
96. Id. at 3820 (statement of Senator Edmunds). 
97. ld. at 3809. 
98. /d. at 3824 (The two parts of this quotation are separated by Senator Sumner's 
remarks.). 
99. ld. (statement of Senator Howard). 
100. For the language of Edmunds' amendment, see infra text accompanying note 
103. Drake's bill, id. at 3809, 3816, as modified by Edmunds' proposal, id. at 3824, ulti-
mately became the Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230 (1870) [hereinafter referred 
to as the 1870 Act]. 
101. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3824 (1870) (emphasis added). 
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jurisdiction. 102 If refusing an appeal were the only result, Klein 
would be left with his judgment. 
In response, Senator Edmunds concluded the defense of 
Drake's amended proposal with a tour de force of sophistical 
reasoning: 
Mr. EDMUNDS. No; when the case comes up on appeal the 
case is in the Supreme Court, and now we direct the Supreme 
Court in cases of this kind, where before we said they should 
reverse the judgment, which would merely remand them to the 
Court of Claims again-that would be the effect of that-we 
say they shall dismiss the case out of court for want of jurisdic-
tion; not dismiss the appeal, but dismiss the case-everything. 
Mr. HOWARD .... [W]hat would be the condition of the 
cause itself after the Supreme Court should have dismissed it? 
Dismissed it from what? 
Mr. EDMUNDS. Dismissed it out of court. 
Mr. HOWARD. Out of its own jurisdiction. It will reach no 
further than the extent of its own jurisdiction. Where is the 
case then? 
Mr. EDMUNDS. The case is dead and gone; it is in no 
court whatever. Then if the party has a case which will appeal 
to the equitable consideration of the Congress, of course he can 
come here by petition. We cannot stop that. 
Mr. HOWARD. What I am anxious to attain is the utter 
extinguishment and annilhilation of the cause of action itself. 
Mr. EDMUNDS. This is an utter extinguishment of it, be-
cause the statute of limitations has now run so that nobody can 
bring a new cause in these cases in the Court of Claims; but 
only those that are there now can be heard. 108 
Edmunds had virtually the last words in the Senate debate.104 
The Senate passed Drake's bill with Edmunds' modifications -
substituting a requirement that the Supreme Court "dismiss the 
cause" for Drake's original requirement that it "reverse."~011 The 
House, after less interesting debates, agreed to Drake's amend-
ment, 108 and it became law.107 As a result, in effect but not in 
102. ld. (statements of Senator Morton). 
103. ld. (emphasis added). 
104. See id. at 3824-25. 
105. ld. at 3825. 
106. See id. at 5424-27. The House Conference Committee was opposed to Drake's 
amendment. Nevertheless, it compromised this objection and the House appears to have 
voted on Drake's bill as originally proposed. Id. Both Drake's original proposal and the 
bill read to the House of Representatives before passage stated that in cases where a 
claimant's innocence had been established in the Court of Claims by a pardon, "the Su-
preme Court shall on appeal reverse [the] judgment." Compare id. at 3809 with id. at 
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terms, the Supreme Court was required to reverse cases like 
Klein's. The power invoked by Congress in making such a law 
was not merely its power to prescribe substantive rules within 
its legislative competence, but also its power over the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts, its power to revoke its consent to suits 
seeking recoveries from the federal treasury, and possibly its 
power to prescribe rules of evidence.108 The constitutionality of 
the Act of July 12, 1870109 (hereinafter referred to as the 1870 
Act) (Drake's bill as modified by Edmunds' proposal), was the 
central issue in Klein. 110 Most of the remainder of this article 
deals with the rationale upon which the Klein Court ruled the 
1870 Act unconstitutional.111 
5425. Consequently, as read on the floor of the House, the bill that the House of Repre-
sentatives approved on July 9, 1870 was different from that previously approved by the 
Senate. Before his bill was passed by the Senate, Senator Drake modified it, at Senator 
Edward's suggestion, to remove the language requiring the Supreme Court to reverse. Id. 
at 3824-25. The language of the statute reflected this modification. The language read to 
the House, however, did not reflect the modification. See Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 
Stat. 230 (1870). The best explanation is that the wrong printer's version of the bill was 
read to the House on July 9, 1870, but that the House voted on the correct latest version. 
That last version of the House Bill-H.R. 974, Printer's No. 924, ordered printed May 
28, 1870, nearly two months before the vote-did incorporate all the Senate amendments 
at that time. 
107. The Congressional Globe reported that the bill was signed by the President on 
or before July 1~, 1870. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5467 (1870). 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 91, 94, 98-104. 
109. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 18 Stat. 230 (1870). 
110. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136, 142-48 (1872). 
111. The text of that Act reads, in part: 
Provided, [t]hat no pardon or amnesty granted by the President ... shall be ad-
missible in evidence on the part of any claimant in the court of claims as evidence 
in support of any claim against the United States, or to estabish the standing of any 
claimant in said court, or his right to bring or maintain suit therein; nor shall any 
such pardon, amnesty . . . heretofore offered or put in evidence on behalf of any 
claimant in said court, be used or considered by said court, or by the appellate court 
on appeal from said court, in deciding upon the claim of said claimant, or any ap-
peal therefrom, as any part of the proof to sustain the claim of the claimant, or to 
entitle him to maintain his action in said court of claims, or on appeal therefrom; 
but the proof of loyalty required [by the 1863 Act, and by the sections of several 
acts quoted], shall be made by proof of the matters required by said sections, re-
spectively, irrespective of the effect of any executive ... pardon, [or] amnesty ... 
[a]nd in all cases where judgment shall have been heretofore rendered in the court 
of claims in favor of any claimant on any other proof of loyalty than such as is 
above required and provided, and which is hereby declared to have been and to be 
the true intent and meaning of said respective acts, the Supreme Court shall, on 
appeal, have no further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall dismiss the same for 
want of jurisdiction: And provided further, [t]hat whenever any pardon shall have 
heretofore been granted by the President of the United States to any person bring-
ing suit in the court of claims for the proceeds of abandoned or captured property 
under [the 1863 Act as amended] ... and such pardon shall recite, in substance, 
that such person ... was guilty of any ... disloyalty to the United States, and 
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III. THE SuPREME CouRT OPINION IN Klein 
Before passage of the 1870 Act described above, the govern-
ment's hopes for a victory in Klein were largely dependent upon 
the substantive arguments (1) that Congress intended, by the 
1863 and 1868 Acts, to exclude pardonees from compensation 
and (2) that the Constitution's pardon provisions did not forbid 
such legislation. The decision in Padelford at least raised the 
possibility that the government would lose the second argument. 
Padelford prompted the 1870 Act. That Act was intended to re-
quire reversal of Court of Claims judgments; it depended on 
Congress' power over the jurisdiction of federal courts, over con-
sent to suits against the United States as sovereign, and argua-
bly over federal courts' fact-finding processes. 
The government wasted little time in bolstering its original 
argument with the provisions of the 1870 Act, which the Radi-
cals viewed as an independent basis for undoing the Court of 
Claims' judgment. In 1870, the United States moved to dismiss 
Klein's "cause" before the Supreme Court.111 It was not a dis-
missal of the appeal that the government sought. A dismissal 
would have left Klein with his Court of Claims judgment. The 
government sought instead to have the case remanded to the 
Court of Claims with a mandate requiring that court to dismiss 
Klein's case for want of jurisdiction.118 This was in accordance 
with Senator Edmunds' statement that the 1870 Act required 
not the dismissal of the appeal but "the case-everything. "114 
The Supreme Court took two actions. First, it decided the 
Exclusion Issue in the appeal in favor of Klein's pardon-based 
such pardon shall have been accepted in writing, by the person to whom the same 
issued, without an express disclaimer of and protestation against such fact of guilt 
contained in such acceptance, such pardon and acceptance shall be taken and 
deemed in such suit in the said court of claims, and on appeal therefrom, conclusive 
evidence that such person did take part in and give aid and comfort to the late 
rebellion, ... and on proof of such pardon and acceptance, which proof may be 
heard summarily on motion or otherwise, the jurisdiction of the court in the case 
shall cease, and the court shall forthwith dismiss the suit of such claimant. 
Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (1870) (emphasis added). 
112. Motion of Attorney General U.S. to Remand Cause with Direction to Dismiss 
Klein. 
113. The Attorney General's motion was captioned "Motion of Attorney General 
U.S. to Remand Cause with Direction to Dismiss" (emphasis added). The last paragraph 
read: "Therefore move the Court to send back this case to the Court of Claims with a 
mandate that the same be there dismissed for want of jurisdiction as now required by 
law." /d. at 3 (emphasis added). See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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claim. 1111 Second, it decided the "motion to dismiss" against the 
government, holding the 1870 Act unconstitutional,116 and af-
firmed the judgment of the Court of Claims.117 It was only with 
respect to the Exclusion Issue that the dissenters118 disagreed; 
they would have reached the Exclusion Issue by holding the 
1870 Act unconstitutional.119 
Chief Justice Chase's opinion for the Court first discussed 
the question of Klein's constitutional rights in the absence of 
the 1870 Act.120 It concluded that, apart from the 1870 Act, 
Klein had a right to recover compensation.m In the second part 
of the opinion-that which concerns us-Chase took up the ef-
fect of the 1870 Act upon what would otherwise have been 
Klein's right to compensation. He concluded that it had no ef-
fect. 122 In other words, Chase concluded that Klein's right to 
compensation could not be defeated by a simple repeal of the 
1863 Act's provision of compensation for guilty pardonees-the 
provision somewhat questionably read into the 1863 Act by the 
Padelford Court.128 
Additionally, Chase stated that various Congressional pow-
ers-those to govern (1) the jurisdiction of federal courts,114 (2) 
suits against the United States/211 and (3) rules of evidence for 
the federal courts126-are not sufficient to permit Congress to do 
indirectly what could not have been done directly by a simple 
repeal. I will show that his statement as to rules of evidence is 
115. Analytically this is the only way to make sense of Chase's opinion. See infra 
text § IV(A)(1). Structurally, the opinion only roughly approximates this division. The 
first part, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) at 136-42, deals with Klein's property rights, and concludes 
that they had not been divested before the 1870 Act. This material bears most directly 
on the government's right to exclude Klein from recovery. The second part deals with 
the validity of the 1870 Act, and includes arguments which bear both on the Exclusion 
Issue and on jurisdictional issues-e.g., arguments directed to the pardon power and ar-
guments directed specially to Congress' power over the jurisdiction of federal courts and 
suits against the United States. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 142-48. 
116. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 142-48. 
117. /d. at 148. 
118. Justice Miller wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Bradley concurred. 
119. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 148. 
120. Jd. at 136-42. 
121. /d. at 142. 
122. Jd. at 142-48. 
123. See supra text § II(B)(2). Recall that the Padelford court ignores the require-
ment of affirmative proof of loyalty found in the 1868 Act. See also supra note 73 and 
accompanying text. 
124. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145-46. 
125. /d. at 144 (arguing that it is not entirely accurate that the right to sue the 
government is a matter of favor). 
126. /d. at 147. 
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dictum.127 
It is this second part of Chase's opinion which concerns us. 
Unfortunately it is disjointed, ambiguous and generally difficult 
to follow. Chase begins with what seems to be a sovereign immu-
nity argument: the right to sue the government in the Court of 
Claims is not entirely a matter of favor.m Without concluding 
the discussion of sovereign immunity, Chase considers Congress' 
general power to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
under the clause of the Constitution which gives Congress the 
power to make "exceptions" to and "regulations" of the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction. ue He concludes that the 
1870 Act is not a valid exception or regulation. Chase then com-
plains that the 1870 Act is an attempt to: (1) prescribe a deci-
sion for a case pending before the Court, 180 and (2) permit a 
party to a controversy to decide it in his favor. 181 Finally, Chase 
seems to suggest that the 1870 Act is constitutionally infirm be-
cause it attempts to interfere with the federal courts' power to 
weigh evidence. 132 
After having made or suggested these arguments (many in a 
fragmentary way), and after having failed to indicate their rela-
tive weight or interrelationship, if any, Chase states "We think it 
unnecessary to enlarge. The simplest statement is the best. "188 
Indeed it might have been. The Court's statement, however, is 
far from the simplest, or clearest, and it is necessary to sort out 
the possible reasons for the Court's decision. Below I will at-
tempt to deal with the many possible readings of Klein and to 
identify those which are most convincing given the facts of the 
case, the arguments presented in Klein and the state of the law 
at the time. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SuPREME CouRT's DECISION IN Klein 
The focus of this article is Klein's bearing on legislative-ju-
dicial separation of powers doctrines. Part IV, Section A, subsec-
tion 1 dissects Klein, showing that it contains two holdings 
which can be identified with some certainty-that o:p Congres-
sional control of jurisdiction and that on sovereign immunity. 
127. See infra text § IV(B)(1). 
128. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144. 
129. /d. at 145. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. 
130. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. 
131. Id. 
132. ld. at 147. 
133. ld. at 148. 
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Section A, in subsections 2 and 3, analyzes these two holdings. 
Section B deals with arguable additional holdings in Klein 
which relate to the legislative-judicial separation of powers doc-
trine. Section C takes a brief look at Klein's influence on the 
status of the Court of Claims as a full-fledged constitutional 
court. 
A. Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity: Klein's Holdings 
Concerning Congress' Power 
1. THE ISSUES IN PERSPECTIVE 
Klein contains two identifiable holdings, one concerning the 
scope of congressional control over federal jurisdiction and one 
concerning limitations on the doctrine of federal sovereign im-
munity. In reaching these holdings the Supreme Court used a 
three step analysis. In order to affirm Klein's Court of Claims 
judgment, a majority of the Supreme Court had to rule in his 
favor at each step of analysis. 
First, the Court had to address the issue of whether Con-
gress had the power in the 1870 Act to retract the statutory 
rights to recover compensation granted to guilty pardonees in 
the 1863 Act.184 If the Court had found the retraction effective 
as applied in Klein, it would have been required to reverse the 
Court of Claims, and the remaining two steps would not have 
been reached. Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of 
Claims. This entailed a finding that the 1870 Act could not re-
tract Klein's right to compensation. When the 1870 Act is 
viewed as a retraction of a right to compensation, there are two 
ways in which that Act might have been unconstitutional. 
Chase's opinion strongly suggests that either infirmity would 
justify invalidating the Act. 
The first type is a substantive infirmity, based upon an ar-
gument that the exclusion of guilty pardonees from compensa-
tion was beyond Congress' substantive powers. Implicit in this 
argument is the proposition that Klein's right to recover com-
pensation stems not solely from the 1863 Act but at least in part 
from a separate constitutional source. The possible sources are 
134. The government certainly suggested that the right to recover proceeds could 
be withdrawn and the the 1870 Act was such a withdrawal: "The right here asserted by 
the respondents to this motion to be beyond the power of Congress to take away or 
modify ... is a mere statute [sic] right to sue in a statute [sic] court 0 • 0 o" Brief for 
Motions to Dismiss the Cases at 6, Pargoud and Klein (emphasis added). As for 
Pargoud, see infra note 186. 
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the President's power to pardon13~ and the fifth amendment's 
due process clause.136 
The second type of infirmity does not depend upon Con-
gress' power to exclude, but on the timing of the exclusion. Con-
ceding Congress' power to exclude claims like Klein's ab initio, 
an argument for the second type of infirmity would find the 1870 
Act to be an ex post facto law137 or a forbidden attempt to de-
135. At one point Chase states that, among other infirmities, the 1870 Act is objec-
tionable for impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional 
power of the Executive. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147; see also Armstrong v. United States, 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155-56 (1872) (so characterizing the holding in Klein). This hold-
ing seems to indicate holding that Congress could not accomplish a simple retraction of 
Klein's right to compensation. If so, the constitutional power of the Executive to issue 
effective pardons may be just one of the reasons for denying Congress the power to re-
tract Klein's right to compensation. See infra notes 136-38. Since other grounds may 
forbid a retraction of Klein's right of action, one should also recognize the possibility, 
however remote, that the statements on the pardon power can be treated as dictum. But 
see Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155-56 (1872). 
136. Klein's lawyers made a fifth amendment argument. Respondents' Argument in 
Reply at 35. One elaboration of this argument would involve invoking both the fifth 
amendment and the pardon power. While a disloyal claimant's war zone property was 
subject to forfeiture by Congress, a pardon might be seen as eliminating the possibility of 
forfeiture. Hence, after a pardon, a disloyal claimant's property would be fully protected 
by fifth amendment rights. Cf. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 
(1870). This argument does not appear explicitly either in Klein or Padelford. It may 
however have been accepted sub silentio. If so, this helps explain why Chase took pains 
to argue that Wilson had retained a property interest in the proceeds of sale of the cot-
ton. See supra note 62. 
137. Such an argument would not itself be based necessarily upon the pardon 
power. The Chase Court construed the 1863 and 1868 Acts so as not to divest Klein's 
title to the proceeds. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 142; see Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 
543; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. Perhaps the Court went on to view 
the 1870 Act as attaching a new penalty to previously completed acts of disloyalty. In 
other words, the 1870 Act was viewed as working a forfeiture of Klein's right to the 
proceeds previously held in trust for him by the government. This forfeiture in turn 
might have been seen as a violation of the Constitution's prohibition against ex post 
facto laws. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9 cl. 3. According to this view it is not the pardon provi-
sions of the Constitution which forbid punishing pardonees, it is rather, the retroactive 
attachment of penalties to the pardoned disloyal-a class not penalized under the 1863 
Act as interpreted in Padelford-which is forbidden. See supra notes 71-74 and accom-
panying text. 
In Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) the Supreme Court struck down 
an act of Congress on the ground that it was an ex post facto law. That law required 
those who would practice law before certain federal courts to swear they had remained 
loyal to the union. False swearing was punishable by perjury. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 374-81. 
The Court's theory was that the act "imposes a punishment for some acts ... which 
were not punishable [when] committed and for other of the acts which had been punish· 
able it adds a new punishment to that before prescribed .... " 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377. 
Citing Garland, Klein's lawyers did argue that the 1870 Act was an ex post facto 
law. Brief for Appellees 4, 8 (brief in opposition to motion to dismiss) (T.D. Lincoln of 
Counsel); Respondents Argument in Reply 27-30. There is, however, no indication in 
Klein that the 1870 Act was struck down as an ex post facto law. Although the legislative 
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stroy the judgment of a court rendered before its passage.138 
Each of these possible infirmities may have been a basis of the 
majority opinion in Klein. 139 What is clear in Klein and neces-
sary to the result is the holding that, for one or more of the 
reasons just mentioned, Congress was not free simply to repeal 
· Klein's right. 
At the second level of analysis the Court had to consider 
whether Congress' control over the jurisdiction of federal courts 
permitted it to forbid Klein his compensation. Forbidding Klein 
compensation, as discussed above, was an act otherwise prohib-
ited by the Constitution. By affirming Klein's judgment, the Su-
preme Court held that Congress' powers to regulate jurisdiction 
under article III of the Constitution did not independently jus-
tify the reversal of Klein's judgment. 
Finally, at the third level, even though none of Congress' 
other powers could support the 1870 Act, the Court had to de-
termine whether Congress' powers to refuse consent to suits 
against the United States could support the 1870 Act. It is clear 
the Court considered this issue.14° Consequently, its affirmance 
of the Court of Claims' decision entails a recognition of some 
limit on Congress' power to invoke the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. The remainder of this section examines the scope of 
Klein's holdings concerning congressional control of federal 
court jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. 
2. KLEIN AND LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CONTROL THE 
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS 
a. The jurisdictional issues framed 
Article III of the Constitution contains what appears to be 
an exhaustive list of the types of cases which federal courts may 
entertain. 141 Congress, nevertheless, has broad powers to regu-
history of the 1870 Act suggests a punitive purpose, see supra note 78 and accompanying 
text, Chase says nothing to indicate that he viewed the Act as punitive. These observa· 
tions also apply to an assertion that the Court seriously considered the bill of attainder 
issue also raised in the briefs. Respondent's Argument in Reply 30-35. 
138. See infra text § IV(B)(2). 
139. From Chase's opinion it is impossible to determine whether there is a single 
holding at the first level of analysis and much dictum or whether there are one or more 
alternative holdings. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 136-48. Surely a holding on the pardon issue is 
close to a certainty. Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155-56 (1872). 
140. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. 
141. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
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late the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court142 and the 
appellate and trial jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 143 
These regulatory powers include the option of conferring on 
those courts less than all of the jurisdiction permitted by the 
Constitution. 144 The dollar amount limitation on federal trial 
courts' diversity jurisdiction is a familiar example of a congres-
sional restriction accepted by courts. 14& 
With respect to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, 
the source of congressional power is purely textual: the Constitu-
tion provides that Congress can make "exceptions" to and "reg-
ulations" for that jurisdiction.148 With respect to the jurisdic-
tion, trial and appellate, of the lower federal courts, the 
existence of regulatory power is based upon inference. By nega-
tive implication the Constitution provides Congress with the 
power not to create inferior federal courts.147 The inference from 
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies be-
tween two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another 
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl 1. The list does appear to be an exhaustive one defining the 
outer limits of the jurisdiction with which Congress can invest courts created under arti-
cle III. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303-04 (1809). On occasion 
some Justices, but never a majority, clearly have recognized congressional power to con-
fer upon those courts a jurisdiction not specified in article III. See National Mutual Ins. 
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 582, 588-604 (1949) (plurality opinion). This 
article is not concerned with the controversy over the existence of congressional power to 
expand the jurisdiction clearly permitted by article III. It is rather concerned with possi-
ble limits on Congress' power to regulate or contract the jurisdiction enumerated in arti-
cle III. 
142. See infra notes 146, 156 and accompanying text. 
143. See infra notes 147, 148 and accompanying text. 
144. See infra notes 146-48, 153-56 and accompanying text. 
145. See 28 U.S.C. 1332 (1976). 
146. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and 
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Juris-
diction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regu-
lations as the Congress shall make. 
U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has viewed congres-
sional power under this section rather broadly at times suggesting complete congres-
sional power to withdraw its appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (dictum). See generally Ratner, supra note 26, 157-58 n.2 
(presenting authority supporting view of congressional powers as plenary, but taking is-
sue with that view). 
147. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one sup:-eme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and es-
tablish .... 
U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 
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such a provision has been that Congress, which need not create 
lower federal courts, surely must have wide latitude in control-
ling the jurisdiction of those courts it chooses to create. us 
Though it is clear Congress has broad regulatory powers, it is 
not clear what limits there are on those powers.149 It is particu-
larly important to determine the extent to which those regula-
tory powers permit Congress to frustrate rights protected by 
other constitutional provisions. The recent proposals to use ju-
risdictional powers to affect busing, abortion, and school prayer 
cases demQilstrate that these issues are alive.1110 Henry Hart, in 
what continues to be the most influential and comprehensive 
study of these matters, cited Klein as the only precedent which 
squarely establishes that there are limits.1111 Some additional 
background is needed to understand this proposition and to as-
sess its accuracy. 
For purposes of our analysis, two basic types of suspect ju-
risdictional regulation must be distinguished. The first is what 
will be called a flat withdrawal or withholding of jurisdiction 
over defined classes of cases or appeals. The result of such a 
withholding, where effective, is that the trial or appellate court 
renders no judgment except the narrow one that the trial or ap-
peal is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The second sort of 
regulation permits the court to entertain the suit or to hear the 
appeal but requires it to decide the case in a certain way. This 
sort of regulation, which will be called "regulating the decision," 
involves an attempt to use jurisdictional powers to limit how a 
court may decide a case over which it generally has jurisdiction. 
The first sort of regulation-a flat denial of jurisdic-
(1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448 (1849). 
148. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 
(8 How.) 440, 448 (1850) (suggesting plenary power to withdraw jurisdiction); HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11-12; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 26 (3d ed. 1976) (stating 
that Congress' discretion is considerable); Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 501-04 (character-
izing the traditional view as one which recognizes complete congressional control, but 
taking issue with that view). For suggestions that Congress' power to withdraw jurisdic-
tion from the lower federal courts is less than complete, see infra note 156. 
149. See infra note 156-58 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 1, 2, 3 and accompanying text. 
151. Of all the cases cited by Hart bearing on limits of congressional power to regu-
late the jurisdiction of federal courts, only Klein strikes down a regulation. Hart, supra 
note 23. The other cases cited involved jurisdictional regulation which was upheld. 
Hart's commentary takes the form of harmonizing their results with his own theory of 
meaningful limitations on congressional control. See Hart, supra note 23, at 1364-65, 
1379-83. 
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tion-generally has been found to be legitimate. 1112 A number of 
cases have upheld such regulation of the lower federal courts ju-
risdiction. 1113 They suggest vast congressional regulatory 
power. 1114 Most commentators take the position that congres-
sional power to withdraw jurisdiction from the lower federal 
courts is virtually unlimited. 11111 As for the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction, the opinion in Ex Parte McCardle, written 
by Chase several years before Klein, and several other Supreme 
Court opinions, arguably recognize congressional carte blanche 
to forbid the Supreme Court from hearing a defined category of 
appeals. 1116 
It will be extremely useful to see what Henry Hart, the ma-
jor commentator on Klein, thought about these issues of con-
gressional control. Hart was somewhat skeptical about the exis-
tence of ultimate limits on Congress' power to withhold types of 
cases from consideration by the lower federal courts. 1117 He did, 
however, argue forcefully that, despite McCardle, Congress is 
not completely free to deny appellate jurisdiction to the Su-
preme Court. 1116 It is important to note, however, that Hart did 
·not think Klein was relevant to this problem of flatly withhold-
ing some or all of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. In-
stead, it seems fair to say that Hart interpreted Klein to pro-
hibit or at least limit the use of jurisdictional powers to regulate 
decisions: 
On the other hand, if Congress directs an Article III court to 
decide a case, I can easily read into Article III a limitation on 
the power of Congress to tell the court how to decide it. Rut-
ledge makes that point clearly in the Yakus case, as the Court 
152. See infra notes 153, 155, 156 and accompanying text. 
153. Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 440 (1850). 
154. /d. 
155. See supra note 148. But see Sager, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1981), discussed in 
supra note 26 and infra note 179. 
156. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1868). See the cases re-
ferred to in Ratner, supra note 26, at 157-58 n.2. 
While the scope of McCardle is very broad, some commentators argue for, and even 
some case law seems to support, the existence of limits on Congress' power to flatly with-
hold or withdraw jurisdiction. For the view that Congress does not possess complete 
power to withdraw appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, see Hart, supra note 
23, at 1364-65, 1401-02; Ratner, supra note 26. For an unusual but similar view as to 
congressional power over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, see Eisenberg, 
supra note 26. For expressions of doubt as to whether there are any limits on Congress, 
see supra text accompanying notes 146 and 148. 
157. Hart, supra note 23, at 1398-99. 
158. /d. at 1364-65. 
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itself made it clear long ago in United States v. Klein . U9 
Hart's reference to the Yakus case provides some indication 
of what he means in this passage. In Yakus v. United States160 
the United States Supreme Court considered a statute giving a 
trial court jurisdiction to conduct a federal criminal prosecution 
but withholding from that court jurisdiction to consider the de-
fendant's constitutional defense.181 Thus Hart's citation of Ya-
kus suggests that Klein's prohibition is against Congress' use of 
jurisdictional powers to require a court to decide a case in an 
unconstitutional manner. In other words, what is prohibited is 
regulating the decision. 
The authors of Hart & Wechsler's Federal Courts and the 
Federal System, Hart's successors, also suggest that regulating 
the decision is the vice to which Klein speaks: 
Does Klein in fact do more [concerning jurisdiction] than hold 
that . . . it is . . . an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial 
function when Congress purports, not to withdraw jurisdiction 
completely, but to bind the Court to decide a case in accor-
dance with a rule of law independently unconstitutional on 
other grounds?182 
In summary, Hart and his successors interpret Klein to pro-
hibit congressional regulation of decisions by means of jurisdic-
tional powers if the effect of its legislation is to require a deci-
sion which would otherwise be unconstitutional. Let us now turn 
to Klein to see whether they are correct. Also of interest is 
whether Hart's successors are correct in their suggestion that 
Klein's jurisdictional holding does not speak to the validity of 
the first pattern of regulation, the pure withholding or with-
drawal of jurisdiction. 
b. Klein's holding concerning regulation of jurisdiction 
Although it is improbable that the Chase Court held that a 
159. /d. at 1373. 
160. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
161. ld. at 418, 429-48. In Hart's view the Yakus Court's decision upholding such a 
restriction on jurisdiction, however unfortunate, is not inconsistent with his theory of the 
Klein case and of meaningful limits on congressional regulation of jurisdiction. The dis-
tinction is that under the statute upheld in Yakus, the appellant had been afforded an 
earlier opportunity to present his defense to a court. Hart's citation of Yakus with Klein 
suggests that, had such prior opportunity not been afforded the defendant in Yakus, the 
statute considered in Yakus would have been invalid under Klein. Hart, supra note 23, 
at 1379-80. 
162. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 316. 
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pure withholding of jurisdiction was unconstitutional, there is 
language in Klein that would support such an interpretation. 168 
At one point the Court says it is required by the 1870 Act "to 
dismiss the appeal." Additionally the Court uses the words 
"withhold appellate jurisdiction"164 and, at one point, states that 
if certain facts are found, the Supreme Court's jurisdicton of the 
case ceases. 1611 
If it read the 1870 Act to require only dismissal of the ap-
peal, Klein then would hold that, when appellate jurisdiction is 
withheld as a means to an unconstitutional end, the statute 
withholding jurisdiction is unconstitutional. If so read, Klein 
casts grave doubts on the constitutionality of many of the pro-
posals currently pending before Congress limiting jurisdiction 
over a specified category of cases. 166 One argument for this view 
of Klein is that the 1870 Act did not specifically state that Con-
gress has employed its regulatory powers over the jurisdiction of 
federal courts to regulate the substance of the Court's decision. 
Additionally it is difficult to see how it is even arguable that 
powers to regulate jurisdiction include powers to regulate deci-
sions. Thus, it is tempting to read the 1870 Act as aimed at the 
elimination of appellate jurisdiction, instead of actually being 
aimed at the regulation of decisions. It would be equally tempt-
163. Some excerpts from the Klein opinion will prove helpful. 
If it [the 1870 Act] simply denied the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, 
there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the power of 
Congress to make "such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction" as should seem 
to it expedient. 
But the language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to with-
hold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its great and controlling 
purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which this court 
had adjudged them to have .... It provides that whenever it shall appear that any 
judgment of the Court of Claims shall have been founded on such pardons, without 
other proof of loyalty, the Supreme Court shall have no further jurisdiction of the 
case and shall dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction . . . . 
. . . The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point; but when it ascer-
tains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and it is re-
quired to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction. 
It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Con-
gress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power. 
The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and thereupon 
to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the bill. What is 
this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a case in a particular way? . . . We 
are directed to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment must be affirmed 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145-46 (emphasis added). 
164. ld. at 145. 
165. ld. at 146. 
166. See supra notes 1, 2 and 3 and accompanying text. 
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ing to read Chase's statements about "withholding" to indicate 
that the Klein Court viewed the 1870 Act as simply withholding 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Despite the Court's use of the words "dismiss the appeal," 
the Klein opinion can not be interpreted as holding unconstitu-
tional a pure withholding of appellate jurisdiction. First, the 
concept of jurisdictional powers which includes the power to reg-
ulate decisions, while not easy to grasp, is intelligible. In the Ya-
kus case, cited by Hart as similar to Klein, the statute in issue 
clarified the mechanics of jurisdictional regulations which deter-
mine decisions.187 In Yakus, a court was required to hear a case 
but deprived of jurisdiction to consider the defendants' constitu-
tional defense.188 This requirement, which was explicit in Yakus, 
demonstrates the intelligibility, if not the desirability, of a juris-
dictional mechanism which would compel a court to reach a re-
sult otherwise unconstitutional. Its mechanics involve Congress' 
retracting some but not all of the court's jurisdiction in a case. 
In other words, Congress gives the Court jurisdiction to decide a 
case but purports to withdraw from the Court jurisdiction to de-
cide in a particular way. Congress, thus, effectively prohibits the 
courts from giving effect to certain provisions · of the 
Constitution. 
Second, such a mechanism is the only intelligible means of 
turning jurisdictional regulation into substantive regulation.188 It 
must be this that the Court found unconstitutional in Klein. A 
careful reading of the decision leaves no doubt that the 1870 Act 
was, in Chase's opinion, a regulation of the Court's decision, and 
not a withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction. The Court knew that 
the Radicals had drafted the statute. The government invoked 
the statute in Klein to require, in effect, the reversal of a lower 
court judgment170 and not merely the dismissal of the appeal. If 
it had misunderstood the act and interpreted it to require the 
dismissal of the appeal, Chase's _statements would make no 
sense. Chase concluded that the Act operated in Klein as "a 
means to [the] end"171-in other words, as a prescription of a 
167. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
168. Id. at 429-38. 
169. Any other mechanism would seem to rest simply upon an assertion that the 
power to regulate jurisdiction is the power to regulate substance. The mechanism dis-
cussed in the text is an attempt to regulate jurisdiction, but admittedly to substantive 
ends. Once the mechanism is identified, the question of its validity remains. 
170. What was required was reversal in substance but not in form. See supra text 
accompanying notes 97-109. --------
171. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. ----
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"rule of decision"~72 to deny Klein's pardon rights. But this con-
clusion is just not true if a dismissal of the appeal is all that was 
required of the Court. Klein would then have retained his Court 
of Claims judgment. Indeed, if the 1870 Act had offered the 
Court such an easy way of protecting Klein's rights while avoid-
ing constitutional conflict, surely this is the path the Court 
would have taken it. 
Chase stated that the Court was given "jurisdiction . . . to a 
given point"178 but beyond this point and upon making certain 
determinations the Court must dismiss the cause. When this ob-
servation is coupled with his characterization of the 1870 Act as 
one which prescribed an unconstitutional rule for decision mak-
ing,174 a sensible interpretation of Chase's view of the 1870 Act 
emerges. Jurisdiction "to a given point"1711 includes not only the 
jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction, but a further limited 
jurisdiction to dismiss the "cause."178 The cause is not the ap-
peal but is in the words of Senator Edmunds, the draftsman of 
that part of the 1870 Act, "the case-everything."177 The with-
holding then is not the withholding of jurisdiction to hear an 
appeal but the withholding of jurisdiction to use certain clauses 
of the Constitution in reviewing the decision of a lower court. 
For example, the 1870 Act was an attempt to deny certain plain-
tiffs the use of the pardon provisions of the Constitution. In 
short, the 1870 Act was not a pure withholding of jurisdiction; it 
attempted to "regulate the decision." Thus, Hart and his succes-
sors seem correct when they suggest178 that Klein does not im-
pose limits on Congress' power to deny the opportunity to ap-
peal in any class of cases. For example, there may be limits on 
Congress' power to deny an appeal in an action that the govern-
ment has won in the lower court, but such a limitation can not 
be found in Klein.179 
172. /d. at 146. 
173. ld. 
174. ld. 
175. Id. 
176. ld.; see supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 159 and 162. 
179. In an article published since this one was completed for publication, Professor 
Lawrence Sager concludes that Klein has some bearing on Congress' power simply to 
withdraw categories of cases from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Sager, The 
Supreme Court 1980 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Author-
ity to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 29 (1981). 
He concludes that Klein's aftermath in the Court of Claims lends support to the exis-
tence of judicial power to restrain, if not prevent, Congress from withdrawing jurisdiction 
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A difficult question remains as to the scope of the holding in 
Klein which prohibits congressional regulation of decisions. 
Which courts are protected under Klein? Chase states that the 
1870 Act is not a valid exception to or regulation180 of the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Hart interprets Klein to 
limit Congress' jurisdictional powers when Congress "directs an 
Article III court to decide a case."181 Whether it is fair to read 
in order to defeat court-declared Constitutional rights. Id. at 27-29. 
As discussed in the text above, Klein itself does not speak definitively to the power 
of Congress to withdraw jurisdiction in a category of cases. Klein involved instead an 
attempt by Congress to use its jurisdictional powers to compel a court to take jurisdic-
tion of a case and to decide it in a way which was at odds with the pardon provisions of 
the Constitution. Sager does not assert that Klein itself went 'beyond a ruling against 
congressional tampering with a court's decision making. He does not assert that Klein 
itself refused to honor a simple withdrawal of jurisdiction. Instead he notes that, shortly 
after Klein was decided, the Court of Claims did refuse to honor a simple withdrawal of 
its jurisdiction, presumably based upon its reading of Klein. Sager notes that in Waring's 
Case, 7 Ct. Cl. 501 (1872), the Court of Claims continued to hear claims which were 
withdrawn from it by the 1870 Act, parts of which were struck down in Klein. Thus, that 
case does contain a sub silentio holding that a simple withdrawal of jurisdiction may 
sometimes be ignored. 
Two other cases are more interesting than the case cited by Sager. In Witkowski's 
Case, 7 Ct. Cl. 393 (1872), the Court of Claims expressly used Klein to invalidate the 
1870. Act's withdrawal of jurisdiction from the Court of Claims, although, as we have 
seen, no such question was necessarily decided in Klein. 7 Ct .. Cl. at 394-99. Still more 
interesting is a post-Klein Supreme Court case holding, sub silentio, that the Court of 
Claims remained open to certain claims despite the 1870 Act's provisions to the contrary. 
In Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872), unlike Klein, the Court of 
Claims had decided against the claimant. 80 U.S. at 155. Consequently, the Supreme 
Court in Armstrong was not required by the application of the unconstitutional rules for 
decision in the 1870 Act to destroy a judgment which was valid when entered. The Su-
preme Court was instead asked to dismiss the appeal because of a lack of jurisdiction. 
Even assuming, however, that the 'supreme Court could read the 1870 Act to leave its 
own jurisdiction intact when the claimant lost below, the 1870 Act clearly provided that 
the Court of Claims would have no jurisdiction to hear the claimants' case on remand. 
See supra note 111. Consequently, even if the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court 
of Claims' original substantive reason for deciding against the claimant, Armstrong, it 
should have been forced to affirm on the ground that the Court of Claims had no juris-
diction to hear the case. The Supreme Courts' remand to the Court of Claims to consider 
Armstrong's claim thus constitutes a refusal to give effect to the 1870 Act's withdrawal of 
the Court of Claims jurisdiction. It might be argued that the 1870 Act was not in force at 
the time of the original Court of Claims decision in Armstrong. That fact should not 
make a difference. If the withdrawal of a lower court's jurisdiction is otherwise valid, an 
appellate court is bound to apply it even though the withdrawal of jurisdiction is subse-
quent to the lower court's decision. See infra text § IV(B)(2). 
Like the sovereign immunity holding I have found in Klein, perhaps Waring's Case, 
which was excavated by Sager, and Armstrong, whose jurisdictional significance I noticed 
after reading Sager, are susceptible to treatment as aberrations. Perhaps not. In the 
meantime they are an important part of the case law record with which scholars and 
judges must contend and which advocates can use. 
180. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. 
181. Hart, supra note 23, at 1373. 
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Klein's holding to include lower federal courts depends upon 
why the 1870 Act was not a valid regulation of the Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Immediately following Chase's 
comments that the exceptions and regulations power does not 
permit congressional regulation of the Supreme Court's decision 
are statements which suggest that article III implicitly protects 
all federal courts. In particular, Chase's statement that "Con-
gress has . . . passed the limit which separates the legislative 
from the judicial power" seems to be founded more on the inher-
ent integrity of article III courts than on specific textual rules 
which govern the Supreme Court. 182 Chase seems to mean that 
Congress' exceptions and regulations powers are restricted by 
general article III limits on what Congress can do with the fed-
eral courts. On this reading of Klein, Congress is also forbidden 
from using its jurisdictional powers to regulate the decisions of 
the lower federal courts. 
3. LIMITS ON CONGRESS' POWER TO REFUSE TO CONSENT TO SUITS 
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
A striking feature of Klein is the Court's decision to allow a 
plaintiff to recover a money judgment against the federal gov-
ernment despite a federal statute which prohibited such a judg-
ment. 183 Cases prior to Klein which dealt with sovereign immu-
182. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. 
183. The Supreme Court in Klein did affirm a money judgment of the Court of 
Claims against the federal government despite an act of Congress which forbade such a 
judgment. One might attempt to diminish Klein's sovereign immunity significance on 
the grounds: (1) that Chase held that Klein's property rights in the proceeds of his cot-
ton had never been divested, see the Court's reasoning on this point in 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
at 142, and (2) that historically suits against federal officers to recover property wrong-
fully held have not been treated as barred by sovereign immunity. United States v. Lee, 
106 U.S. 196, 204-23 (1882). Thus, one might argue that Klein's suit was simply one by a 
claimant against an officer to recover something which was still the claimant's property. 
Such an argument can be put to rest. First, in all cases in which a plaintiff has 
recovered against a federal officer, the officer was a party to the suit and the United 
States was not an· indispensible party. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207-08 
(1882). In Lee an officer was named defendant. /d. at 197, 210-11. In Klein the suit was 
against the United States as sole defendant. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 128. 
Even considering Klein's suit as one which was in substance against the Secretary of 
the Treasury for the return of Wilson's property, this will not bring Klein within Lee. 
First, even suits against federal officers have been viewed as suits against the United 
States where "the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury." Land v. 
Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947); cf. Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500-02 (1921). 
Second, if the Treasury had held the proceeds of each potential claimant under the 
1863 Act in a separate account, arguably important consequences would follow. If a sepa-
rate account existed, Chase's claim that Klein's property rights had never been divested 
is at least intelligible. If there were no such account, Chase's statement is prepostrous. 
HeinOnline -- 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1225 1981
1981:1189 United States v. Klein 1225 
nity all suggested that there are no limits on Congress' power to 
limit claims for pecuniary compensation from the federal gov-
ernment.184 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have main-
tained or suggested in dictum that Congress has plenary control 
over such suits even where compensation is sought for violation 
Without such an account, Klein's right was merely a right of action against an undiffer-
entiated mass of Treasury assets. If there were no such account, the judgment in Klein 
then clearly required that which is today barred by sovereign immunity-a judgment 
which, contrary to Congress' will, "would expend itself on the public Treasury." Land v. 
Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947). If there were no such segregated account, Klein is the 
break in an otherwise unbroken chain of judicial refusals to raid the federal treasury. 
The available evidence compels a conclusion that there was not a segregated ac-
count. Although records were kept of the amount of the cotton proceeds, these proceeds 
were mingled with other treasury assets. When claimants were paid under the 1863 Act, 
the funds were drawn from general treasury funds. 
First, and most convincing, the 1863 Act was treated as a permanent indefinite ap-
propriation permitting expenditure of treasury funds to pay the judgments of the Court 
of Claims under that act. Undoubtedly the reason it was called a permanent indefinite 
appropriation is that it was impossible for Congress to know precisely how much was to 
be paid out in any one year. This suggests that Klein's money came from an undifferenti-
ated source, not a particular account. See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY DEPT., RECEIPTS AND Ex-
PENDITURES 1869-1870 223 (1870) (Estimate of Appropriations for The Fiscal Year End-
ing June 30, 1872) (on file in the offices of the Wisconsin Law Review). If the Secretary 
of Treasury had simply been viewed as holding the proceeds separately from the general 
treasury funds, no appropriation would have been necessary. 
Second, the moneys received from the sale of abandoned and captured property con-
tributed to the amount by which general treasury funds were reported to increase annu-
ally. See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY DEPT., RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES 1863-1864 20-37 (1865) 
(An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States for the Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 1864) (on file in the offices of the Wisconsin Law Review). 
Third, Klein's payment was recorded as a general expenditure which depleted trea-
sury funds. See U.S. TREASURY DEPT., RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES 1873-1874 56 (1875) 
(An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States for the Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 1872) (on file in the offices of the Wisconsin Law Review); U.S. TREA· 
SURY DEPT., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING 
JUNE 30, 1872 4-5 (1872) (on file in the offices of the Wisconsin Law Review). 
Finally, the Treasury Appropriations warrant (No. 1013 dated August 22, 1872) (on 
file in the offices of the Wisconsin Law Review) pursuant to which funds were officially 
transferred to pay Klein, was a general appropriation warrant which debited the general 
treasury account for appropriations. Indeed, this warrant also transferred funds to be 
used for running the Smithsonian. Although this transfer was made official after Klein 
had been paid, see infra note 326 and accompanying text, there is no reason to believe 
that at the time of payment funds were taken from a segregated account which con-
tained proceeds of the sale of abandoned and captured property. Again there is no evi-
dence that such a segregated account ever existed. 
184. See United States v. Eckford, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 484, 487-91 (1867); De Groot v. 
United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419, 431-32 (1866); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 
272, 289-91 (1850); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 287-88 (1846). The 
cases hold that the United States is not amenable to suit under the circumstances 
presented. The Court's language suggests no exceptions, but of course the cases cannot 
so hold with respect to circumstances not presented. 
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of constitutional rights. 1811 Congress may restrict such claims by 
the simple expedient of refusing of consent to suit. Though it 
held the 1870 Act unconstitutional, the Klein Court must have 
considered the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a basis for up-
holding the 1870 Act. The 1870 Act does not use the word "im-
munity" or the phrase "consent to suit." Instead, it is phrased in 
terms of jurisdiction and evidence. But the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity was raised by the government in support of the 1870 
Act. 188 That doctrine was familiar to and accepted by the Chase 
Court. 187 Thus, Chase's rejection of the argument "that the right 
to sue the government in the Court of Claims is a matter of 
favor"188 must be read as a rejection of sovereign immunity as a 
sufficient basis for the 1870 Act. 
While Chase recognized that Congress could have refused to 
create a Court of Claims, he suggested there are some limits on 
Congress' power to regulate the jurisdiction of that Court once it 
is formed: 
It was urged in argument that the right to sue the government 
in the Court of Claims is a matter of favor; but this seems not 
entirely accurate. It is as much the duty of the government as 
of individuals to fulfill its obligations. Before the establish-
185. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934) (dictum); Schillinger v. 
United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1894) (assuming arguendo that the case arose under 
the fifth amendment's taking provision, the Court still concluded that its only jurisdic-
tion was that given by statute). 
186. Klein had a companion case, Pargoud v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 156 
(1872), pending before the Court at the same time and ultimately reported in the United 
States Reports shortly after the Klein opinion. See infra notes 208-14. The government 
filed one consolidated motion to "dismiss" both cases. In a separate brief on behalf of 
Pargoud the government began its argument as follows: 
The principal is fundamental, that every government has an inherent right to 
protect itself against suits; and if, in the liberality of legislation they are permitted, 
it is only on such terms and conditions as are prescribed by statute . . . . 
The United States as sovereign are not liable to suit and if they submit them-
selves to suit it is ex gratia and on such terms as they may see fit . . . 
Supplemental brief for the United States on Motion to Dismiss at 1, Pargoud (citation 
omitted). 
In the brief filed jointly in Pargoud and Klein the government stated: 
"The collection of abandoned property," and the payment of its proceeds into 
the National Treasury, as prescribed by this act of March 12, 1863, being within the 
lawful authority of Congress, it inevitably follows that the disposal of those pro-
ceeds, in any manner, is within the unlimited discretion of Congress; that is unlim-
ited by any judicial right of supervision, there being no method of drawing money 
from the Treasury of the United States except "in consequence of appropriations 
made by law. (Art. 1, Sec. 9 par. 6, Constitution of the United States)." 
Brief for Motions to Dismiss the Cases at 3, Pargoud and Klein. 
187. See the cases cited in infra note 192. 
188. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144. 
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ment of the Court of Claims claimants could only be heard by 
Congress. 189 
One might read Chase's statement that "it is the duty of the 
United States to fulfill its obligations ... " as being consistent 
with a regrettable power to evade those obligations by withhold-
ing consent to suits. Chase, however, did not say merely that the 
government has a duty to fulfill its obligations. He said it is "not 
entirely accurate" that "the right to sue in the Court of Claims 
is a matter of favor." Read fairly, this strongly indicates that 
suits against the United States are not entirely dependent on 
congressional favor. 
Although federal sovereign immunity is not expressly recog-
nized in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has viewed it as an 
inherent privilege of the federal government.180 There is, how-
ever, respectable opinion to the contrary which views sovereign 
immunity as designed for and suited to monarchies and, there-
fore, incompatible with our system of government.181 It is tempt-
ing to read Chase's statement broadly, to indicate a major re-
treat from the Court's pronouncements of congressional control 
over suits against the United States.181 Possible meanings of 
Chase's statements are explored below. Some explanations are 
extreme, not harmonizing well with the case law or commentary, 
but they are not implausible. 
a. Extreme readings of Klein's sovereign immunity holding 
Klein might be read to require the government to provide a 
judicial forum for claims against the federal government. This is 
an extreme reading. Read somewhat less radically, Klein rejects 
sovereign immunity as a defense once a court has been estab-
lished to hear claims against the government.188 Another and 
still milder view of such a holding is that sovereign immunity 
provides Congress with a means of barring some types of claims 
189. Id. (emphasis added). 
190. See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 
(1939). 
191. See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 1-9 (1924); 
cf. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456 (1793) (separate opinion of Justice 
Wilson). 
192. For such pronouncements near the time of Klein, see Gibbons v. United 
States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274-76, (1868); De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 
419, 431-32 (1866). 
193. For a discussion of the difficulties involved with such a reading of Klein and 
the conclusion that these difficulties are not quite insurmountable, see infra text accom-
panying note 206. 
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but not others after the establishment of a court to hear claims 
against the government. This somewhat less sensational view 
would concede to Congress power to avoid ordinary tort and 
contract claims under the doctrine of sovereign immunity but 
would still recognize a judicial forum for some claims against the 
federal government. Cases to which the application of sovereign 
immunity seems particularly inappropriate in light of its origins 
and functional justifications could be litigated in such a forum. 
Two categories of cases in which the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity is inappropriate come to mind; Klein might be included 
in either or both. 
First, there are those cases which reflect the fact that the 
United States government is limited in ways uncharacteristic of 
absolute sovereigns. 194 The fifth amendment limitation on the 
taking of property without compensaton arguably needs court 
enforcement if it is to be more than an admonition to the 
majoritarian branches of government.1911 Although the fifth 
amendment is not expressly mentioned in Klein, the 1870 Act 
may have been struck down on "taking" grounds.198 
Second, in cases where a plaintiff claims rights conferred by 
one part of our trinitarian federal government in opposition to 
another part, the defense of sovereign immunity might be seen 
as inappropriate. 197 In Klein, for example, if the President's par-
don power was the reason for invalidating the 1870 Act, then 
plaintiffs like Klein were the best advocates of that pardon 
power. 198 It could be argued that sovereign immunity should not 
afford Congress a means of insulating from adjudication its in-
trusions upon the executive branch. 
While these possible limits on federal sovereign immunity 
are interesting, they have no support in case law, except possibly 
in Klein itself. 199 Indeed, the Supreme Court later seems to have 
rejected the possible Fifth Amendment exception to the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity.100 The Court seems never to have consid-
194. See Borchard, supra note 191, at 4-5. 
195. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
196. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
197. See Borchard, supra note 191, at 4-5. 
198. Cf. Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975). But cf. Kennedy v. 
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The notion is one of surrogate standing. See L. 
TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-12 (1978). 
199. Certainly the radical position discussed in the preceeding paragraphs conflicts 
with the modern position subsequently taken by the Supreme Court. See Lynch v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). 
200. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1894). 
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ered the narrower separation of powers exception to sovereign 
immunity mentioned above. The sweeping statements of con-
gressional control found well before Klein to the present day, 
however, indicate that the separation of powers exception to 
sovereign immunity is unsupported by the case law.101 Although 
not quite decisive,201 (1) Chase's concession that Congress need 
not have created a Court of Claims,103 (2) Congress' general 
power not to create lower federal courts,104 and (3) Congress' 
failure to create the Court of Claims before 1855,1011 make it diffi-
cult to argue convincingly for either of the extreme views of 
Klein which attempt to explain why the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity may be inappropriate in some cases.108 
201. See the cases cited in supra notes 184 and 192. 
202. For the proposition that the arguments are not quite decisive, see infra text 
accompanying note 206. 
203. For Chase's statement, see 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145 ("Undoubtedly the legis-
lature has complete control over the organization and existence of [the Court of 
Claims]"). 
204. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. 
205. For the history of the Court of Claims, see Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 
552-58 (1962). 
206. The arguments against either extreme reading of Klein are formidable. Chase 
concedes that Congress might haue omitted to create a Court of Claims, perhaps sug-
gesting such an omission would be a constitutional privilege of Congress. According to 
this view, Congress has at least one way of avoiding the legitimate claims of its citizens 
by means of sovereign immunity. Beyond this, according to the prevailing view, Congress 
may refuse to create any lower federal courts . This option offers Congress another 
means of judiciously avoiding claims. See supra text accompanying notes 148-53. 
While such arguments against an extreme reading of Klein are forceful, and perhaps 
ultimately dispositive, there is a response. First, as noted above, Chase indicates in Klein 
that the right to sue in the Court of Claims is not entirely a matter of favor. He further 
states that it is the "duty" of the government to fulfill its obligations. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
at 144. Taken seriously this statement undercuts the notion that Congress' failure to 
create the Court of Claims is constitutionally privileged. Instead, one could argue that 
Congress had only the power to refuse to create such a court, just as it had the power, 
but not the right, to refuse to create the Supreme Court in violation of the Constitution's 
clear command. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also the portion of the dissenting opin-
ion in Pargoud v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 337, quoted in infra text accompanying note 
214 in which, inter alia, a similar argument may have been intended. Some problems 
remain. 
First, in the case of the Supreme Court, the Constitution clearly commands its crea-
tion. U.S. CoNsT. art. III; § 1. It might be objected that in the case of inferior federal 
courts, such as the Court of Claims, the structure of article III seems to give Congress 
the freedom to create or not to create such inferior courts. See id. If there is an answer 
to this objection it is that the fifth amendment, which requires compensation for takings, 
commands the creation of such a court. That amendment is, of course, subsequent to 
article III and could be interpreted to limit the original plan for carte blanche congres-
sional powers over the existence and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The argu-
ment then is that Congress has the power but not the right to avoid suits against the 
government by refusing to create a Court of Claims. Once created, however, that court 
must hear fifth amendment claims even if Congress has not consented to them. 
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b. Sovereign immunity and discrimination against pardonees 
There is, however, a much narrower and more plausible way 
of making sense of Chase's opinion. The Court may have taken 
an antidiscrimination position on sovereign immunity. According 
to this view Congress is conceded the constitutional power to 
frustrate even fifth amendment rights by means of sovereign im-
munity. Congress could not, however, open the Court to one 
class of persons and close it to another. Perhaps, for reasons al-
ready discussed above, Congress is not free to open the courts to 
truly innocent plaintiffs while closing them to those whose inno-
cence comes by way of a pardon. The pardon power itself could 
reasonably be viewed to prohibit such discrimination. Even to-
day the remedy for unconstitutional discrimination in limiting 
jurisdiction might be to open the Court to the excluded class (as 
Chase seems to have done) instead of closing the Court to the 
favored class. 207 
This argument is flawed. If the Court of Claims is free to ignore restrictions on its 
jurisdiction with respect to certain constitutionally based claims, why were not federal 
trial courts, in such special cases prior to the creation of the Court of Claims but after 
passage of the fifth amendment, free to ignore the complete restriction on their jurisdic-
tion over suits against the government? In no case did a claimant prevail in a suit for 
compensation against the government prior to the creation of the Court of Claims. In 
each case the claim was' dismissed on the ground that congressional consent was neces-
sary. None of these cases, however, presented the question of a federal court's jurisdic-
tion to hear a claim for compensation for an intentional taking by the federal govern-
ment despite a lack of congressional consent. See the cases cited in supra note 184. Even 
if one views the sweeping statements in the cases as meant to encompass a case of inten-
tional taking they are still dictum. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century 
that the Supreme Court stated clearly, still in dictum, that sovereign immunity trumps 
fifth amendment claims to compensation. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166-
68 (1894). 
Finally, it might be asked why, if there is a fifth amendment exception, state courts 
could not hear such suits against the United States prior to Congress' consent to such 
suits in federal court. Cf. Hart, supra note 23, at 1401-02. This possibility seems, how-
ever, never to have been raised in the Supreme Court prior to Klein and so one might 
argue it had not been rejected. Given the broad language of contemporary Supreme 
Court cases requiring consent to suits against the federal government in federal court, 
see cases cited in supra note 192, the Court almost certainly would have rejected a suit 
against the federal government brought in either a state or federal court which sought 
compensation for an intentional taking. 
The argument made above does not extend to the possible legislative-executive sep-
aration of powers exception mentioned in this section of the text; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 197-98. To succeed, this second argument which is based upon the 
Constitution's structure, would have to overcome the inference drawn from article Ill's 
provision for such inferior federal courts as Congress "may" establish. See supra text 
accompanying notes 147-48. 
207. See Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitu-
tional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 301 (1979). 
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There is at least some evidence which suggests that Chase 
considered the issue of discrimination when he rejected the sov-
ereign immunity argument in favor of the 1870 Act. Pargoud v. 
United States was Klein's companion case before the Supreme 
Court. 208 Pargoud raised issues similar to those in Klein, and the 
government filed a single brief urging dismissal of both Klein 
and Pargoud under the 1870 Act. 209 It was the decision in Klein 
which permitted the Court's disposition of Pargoud. Despite the 
1870 Act's provision to the contrary, Pargoud's pardon entitled 
him to recover property under the 1863 Act.11° Chase, then, was 
certainly familiar with the record in Pargoud. That record in-
cluded a dissenting opinion in the Court of Claims remarkably 
similar to Chase's later opinion in Klein.211 Both opinions sug-
gest that Congress has at least a moral duty to provide a court 
which would hear claims against the federal government.111 Both 
opinions clearly indicate that there are some legal as well as 
moral constraints upon what Congress can do with a claims 
court if it creates such a court.118 The greatest difference be-
tween the two opinions is that the dissent in Pargoud in the 
Court of Claims, unlike Chase's opinion in Klein, provides some 
guidance as to the nature of the restraints on Congress. 
Nor do I consent to the proposition of the majority that 
the power to sue the government, in this court, is a privilege 
bestowed by Congress and not a right conferred by the Consti-
tution . . . . it is then as much the duty of Congress to provide 
such a tribunal as it is to coin money, to levy taxes, or to regu-
late commerce; and it is the undoubted right of the citizen to 
have such a court . . . . And in the performance of that duty 
have no more right to overstep the constitutional limitations, 
or infringe upon the rights and functions of other departments, 
in the one case than in the others . . . . Could Congress ex-
clude a man because he is a citizen of Pennsylvania or of 
Ohio? or because he is a colored man, or a red-haired man, a 
Catholic or a Protestant? I may be told that in all these speci-
fied cases the Constitution would interfere to prevent such ex-
clusion. I grant it. But no more than it does in the case under 
consideration; for the constitutional power of the President to 
pardon is coextensive with the power of Congress to define and 
208. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 156 (1872). See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 26, at 843-44. 
209. Brief for Motions to Dismiss the Cases. Pargoud and Klein. 
210. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 157 (statement of facts preceding opinion). 
211. 4 Ct. Cl. 337, 347-48 (Casey, Ch. J., dissenting). 
212. Compare 4 Ct. Cl. at 347-48 with 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144-45. 
213. Id. 
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punish offences, except in impeachments.2a 
Klein, thus, may be interpreted to prohibit Congress from cer-
tain forms of discrimination in defining the Court of Claims ju-
risdiction. This harmonizes the Chase argument that there are 
limits on congressional power in the article III area, with other 
judicial pronouncements on the breadth of congressional power 
in this area. Chase had seen the argument that Congress is pro-
hibited from certain forms of discrimination in defining jurisdic-
tion for the Court of Claims in the Pargoud dissent. This view 
also constitutes the least radical departure from the prevailing 
view that Congress' powers over suits against the United States 
are plenary. 
In summary, if Congress ever attempts to repeal the statute 
which permits the federal courts to hear claims for takings 
under the fifth amendment, an imaginative plaintiff's attorney 
could urge that Klein renders the repeal unconstitutional. In the 
alternative, the attorney could argue that, as a result, takings 
claims could be considered by federal district courts under their 
general federal question jurisdiction. 216 However, the existence 
214. The quote in full reads as follows: 
Nor do I consent to the proposition of the majority, that the power to sue the 
government, in this court, is a privilege bestowed by Congress, and not a right 
conferred by the Constitution. The grant of such a power is as express and explicit 
as any other in the Constitution. It was put there not for the benefit of Congress, 
but to maintain and guard the rights of the citizen. And when the situation and 
wants of the country require such a court, and the right to sue the government, it is 
then as much the duty of Congress to provide such a tribunal as it is to coin money, 
to levy taxes, or regulate commerce; and it is the undoubted right of the citizen to 
have such a court. And they have precisely the same warrant for doing so. And in 
the performance of that duty have no more right to overstep constitutional limita-
tions, or infringe upon the rights and functions of other departments, in the one 
case than in the others. And when such a court is established and its jurisdiction 
defined, no citizen of the United States, who has a cause falling within its enumer-
ated faculties, can be excluded arbitrarily, and without just cause from maintaining 
a suit there. To so exclude him, there must be some specified legal disability. If he 
is to be punished by such exclusion for an offence committed, it must be for an 
unpardoned crime. For he can no more be punished in that manner after pardon, 
than he can be tried and convicted and hung for the treason that was remitted and 
purged by the executive clemency. Could Congress exclude a man because he is a 
citizen of Pennsylvania or of Ohio? or because he is a colored man, or a red-haired 
man, a Catholic or a Protestant? I may be told that in all these specified cases the 
Constitution would interfere to prevent such exclusion. I grant it. But no more than 
it does in the case under consideration; for the constitutional power of the President 
to pardon is co-extensive with the power of Congress to define and punish offences, 
except in impeachments. 
4 Ct. Cl. at 347-48 (Casey, Ch. J., dissenting) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis 
added). 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 195, 196, 206. 
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of strong contrary dicta, some doctrinal difficulties and the pres-
ence of the potential narrower holding suggested above combine 
to. make that lawyer's .success unlikely. The antidiscrimination 
holding suggested above seems the narrowest way to explain the 
Klein Court's refusal to hold that the 1870 Act was based validly 
on sovereign immunity. Since the Court of Claims' dissent in 
Pargoud, which prohibited discrimination in defining jurisdic-
tion, was known to Chase, there is reason to believe Chase con-
sidered such a view. If Klein's holding is based on this unconsti-
tutional discrimination, it lends at least some support to the 
proposition that congressional control over suits against the fed-
eral government is not plenary, as often said, but subject to the 
ordinary constitutional prohibitions against discrimination. 
B. Other Possible Separation of Powers Holdings 
Other possible separation of powers holdings in Klein are 
discussed below. It seems possibile that the 1870 Act's attempt 
to repeal Klein's right was unconstitutional because it involved 
an incursion on the court's evidentiary powers or on a court's 
judgment. These issues occur analytically as what I have labeled 
the "first level of analysis." In other words, they offer reasons 
why Congress could not simply repeal Klein's right. Even assum-
ing that a prohibition of either such incursion is the sole or an 
alternative holding at that level, Klein still goes beyond this pro-
hibition of the retraction of Klein's right. As we have seen Klein 
holds that Congress' jurisdictional and sovereign immunity pow-
ers do not support the congressional repeal of those rights. 
1. KLEIN'S ALLEGED HOLDING THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL 
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE LIMITS CONGRESS' POWER TO 
LEGISLATE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The Second Edition of Hart & Wechsler's The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System suggests the presence of a third 
legislative-judicial separation of powers holding in Klein: "Does 
Klein in fact do more than hold that Congress intrudes on the 
judicial function by assuming to prescribe how the Court should 
decide an issue of fact (under threat of loss of jurisdiction)?"118 
The question assumes that Klein contains a holding which limits 
Congress' power to govern the fact-finding process in the federal 
courts. If Klein does contain such a holding, it would be the 
216. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 316. 
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starting place for any development of limits upon Congress' 
power to regulate rules of evidence in the federal courts. Since 
the publication of this reading of the case in Hart & Wechsler's 
Federal Courts and the Federal System the presence of such a 
holding apparently has found some acceptance.217 Klein may be 
interpreted to provide limitations on Congress' power over ques-
tions of evidence. The following passage appears in Klein's ma-
jority opinion: "[T]he court is forbidden to give the effect to evi-
dence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have, 
and is directed to give it an effect precisely contrary . . . . We 
must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit 
which separates the legislative from the judicial power. "218 It is 
not clear that the Court treats the 1870 Act as a regulation of 
evidence. Any substantive law has an impact on the law of evi-
dence: the law of evidence refers to the applicable substantive 
law to determine _the relevance of evidence. Consequently, in 
some expanded sense, every substantive law regulates eviden-
tiary matters. It seems likely that the Klein majority viewed the 
1870 Act as regulating the "evidentiary process" only in this ex-
panded sense. In short, it seems likely that Chase and those who 
joined him in Klein saw the 1870 Act as purely substantive in 
the ordinary sense of the word. 
Elaboration will prove helpful. Clearly, the rule that a par-
don shall not be evidence admissible in court concerning a par-
217. In a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part Chief Judge 
Seitz states: 
The final question [in Klein] was the effect of the 1870 act's provisions prescribing 
the evidence that could be relied upon for certain findings and the result required 
on the basis of other findings. . . . The Court of Claims had, in 1869, rendered a 
decision in Klein's favor, giving effect to the President's grant of pardon and am-
nesty and using evidence proscribed by the 1870 act. The Supreme Court held . . . 
that the 1870 act [did not require] the Court to reverse the Court of Claims decision 
in accordance with the statute's directive regarding the admission and effect of evi-
dence . ... I believe that Klein is apposite to and casts doubt upon the constitu-
tionality of applying the [legislation before us] to [a party to this appeal.] 
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 614 (1974) (Seitz, Ch. J., dissenting in part, 
concurring in part) (emphasis added). In context Chief Judge Seitz clearly means that 
Klein held that the 1870 Act's provisions which were designed to require reversal did not 
require reversal, because the provisions were unconstitutional. While it is clear that 
Chief Judge Seitz believed that Klein contained a holding limiting Congress' power to 
regulate the effects of evidence, it is not clear whether, in his view, it was this aspect of 
Klein which cast doubt on the constitutionality of the statute considered in Butenko. 
See also Note, Separation of Powers and the Federal Rules of Evidence, ·26 HAs-
TINGS L. REv. 1059, 1065-66 (1975). Although the Note never expressly concludes that 
Klein contains a holding which restricts Congress' power to regulate evidence, it strongly 
suggests that Klein contains such a holding. /d. 
218. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. 
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ticular right it confers is a regulation of substantive rights and 
not of fact-finding. Such a regulation can mean only that, as a 
matter of law, the pardon does not confer the right in question. 
Therefore, the passage just quoted concerns the power of Con-
gress to regulate the effect of a pardon, although the Court 
makes its arguments in the trappings of a statement about evi-
dentiary rules. The truth of all this is so apparent that it is not 
likely that the Court saw the issue, described in the quotation 
above, as one involving the law of evidence. Indeed, one of 
Klein's lawyers made essentially this point in his brief in opposi-
tion 'to the government's motion to dismiss.219 
To be fair to those who see a fact-finding holding in Klein, 
there is a possibility that the Chase Court rejected the 1870 Act 
on the ground that the creation of a presumption impermissibly 
regulated the fact-finding process. The 1870 Act required the 
courts to treat as guilty pardonees who failed to protest the reci-
tal of guilt in their pardon. The presumption was conclusive; a 
pardon absent a protest of its recitation of guilt was to yield, in 
all cases, a factual conclusion of disloyalty which in turn re-
quired an exclusion from compensation under the 1863 Act.120 
While one reasonably might view a rebuttable presumption as a 
regulation of the court's fact-finding process, the analytically 
preferable view is that a conclusive presumption is a rule of sub-
stantive law.221 
Not all modern Supreme Court opinions have taken a realis-
tic view of conclusive presumptions. In a few cases they have 
been treated as rules of evidence.:m Consequently, it is certainly 
possible that the Chase Court, sitting a century ago, was equally 
confused as to the evidentiary nature of conclusive presump-
tions. It is therefore possible that that Court felt a failure to 
protest the recital of guilt in a pardon was not sufficiently proba-
tive of disloyalty to justify a conclusive presumption. This con-
clusive presumption would, in effect, shut out all of the evidence 
219. Respondent's Argument in Reply at 25, Klein. 
220. For the text of the 1870 Act, see supra note 111. 
221. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO·AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 2492 
(3d ed. 1940); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Pro-
tection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800, 827-30 (1974). 
222. In Vlandis v. Klein, 412 U.S. 441, 445-54 (1973), the Court apparently viewed 
a provision of Connecticut law as creating a conclusive presumption. The Court tested 
the validity of the presumption not as if it were a rule of substantive law, but rather in 
terms of: (1) the evidentiary bearing of the fact actually proved on the existence of the 
fact presumed, and (2) the difficulty of otherwise proving the fact presumed. /d. at 451. 
See also NoTE, supra note 221, at 827-30. 
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that a non-pardonee otherwise would be permitted to introduce 
in support of a claim of loyalty. A non-pardonee would be per-
mitted, for example, to produce witnesses to testify as to loyalty; 
a pardonee would not be permitted to do this unless he had had 
the foresight to protest the pardon's recitation of his guilt. The 
Court might well have felt that there are limits upon Congress' 
power to create a conclusive presumption and that the 1870 Act 
surpassed those limits. Klein occasionally has been cited as pre-
cedent for the rule that there are limits on congressional power 
to create conclusive presumptions.128 
Even indulging in the assumptio:ns that the Klein Court saw 
the creation of a conclusive presumption as a vice of the 1870 
Act and mistakenly viewed conclusive presumptions as eviden-
tiary regulations, it is, nevertheless, clear that Klein does not 
contain a holding on the issue of conclusive presumptions. Cases 
treating the validity of a conclusive presumption could have 
arisen under the 1870 Act, but Klein was not such a case. This is 
true because none of the crucial facts was disputed in Klein and, 
as a consequence, the conclusive presumption did not operate to 
establish any fact in that case. This is true because it was stipu-
lated in Klein that Wilson had served as a surety for rebel of-
ficers and was thus, disloyal. The conclusive presumption under 
the 1870 Act required that when a court found that there was a 
non-protested pardon, the court must find disloyalty. The find-
ing of Wilson's disloyalty, made by the Court of Claims in Klein, 
was not, however, based upon Wilson's receipt of a pardon but 
rather upon the facts to which Klein stipulated. These conceded 
facts were adjudged, as a matter of law, to constitute disloyalty 
under the 1870 Act. In turn, such disloyalty under that Act was 
viewed, as a matter of law-the constitutional law of par-
dons-as having no effect on Klein's claim.12' 
223. The authors of HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, suggest that the fact-finding 
holding in Klein deals with presumptions, and in connection with that holding they cite 
a modern case dealing with presumptions under a former version of a federal law regu-
lating firearms. /d. at 316, citing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Klein has 
been cited in a brief before the Supreme Court for the proposition that conclusive pre-
sumptions are invalid. Respondent's Brief at 7-8, Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). 
224. The report of the Supreme Court's opinion published in the Court of Claims 
reporter, 7 Ct. Cl. 240, indicates that this is how the Court of Claims findings were un-
derstood by the Supreme Court: 
As in Padelford's Case, the disloyal acts of Mr. Wilson were discovered after 
the judgment in the Court of Claims, and were incorporated into the findings of the 
court by consent of parties. The opinion . . . was entirely upon other matters than 
the effect of the amnesty which was not considered. 
7 Ct. Cl. at 241 n. * (emphasis added); see also 7 Ct. Cl. at vii-viii. The record in Klein 
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An analogy may be useful. At one time federal law provided 
a rebuttable presumption that any firearm possessed by certain 
persons had been procured in interstate commerce. 2211 It was a 
crime for such persons to possess firearms which had been pro-
cured in interstate commerce. Note, however, that if, in a case 
under this law, a criminal defendant had conceded that, in fact, 
he procured his firearm in interstate commerce, a judgment con-
victing him does not contain a holding about the validity of the 
presumption. The reason for this is that the presumption was 
not employed in that case to establish an element of the crime. 
Similarly, even if the 1870 Act is viewed as partially eviden-
tiary-as prescribing a conclusive presumption-the conclusive 
presumption contained in the Act was not applied in Klein be-
cause the facts establishing disloyalty were stipulated. The only 
portion of the 1870 Act which regulated fact-finding was not ap-
plied by the Court of Claims in Klein. The issues presented in 
Klein were pure issues of law: given a complete record of fact 
which was not challenged by either of the parties, the issue was 
what the correct result would be. As a result of this analysis, it is 
clear that Klein does not contain a holding striking down a con-
indicates that the fact of disloyalty was stipulated by the parties on December 21, 1870. 
Supplemental Findings of the Court of Claims 1-2. This date is after the 1870 Act but 
the stipulation makes it clear that the 1870 Act was not used to find the fact that Wilson 
was disloyal. The Supplemental Findings refer to a decision of the Court of Claims over-
ruling the motion for rehearing on May 23, 1870 without explanation. It seems likely that 
the court at that time dismiSBed the petition for rehearing without finding facts other 
than that Klein received a pardon. This is true because under Padelford, decided on 
April 20, 1870 and announced April 30, the court probably felt constrained tQ decide for 
Klein without determining Wilson's loyalty in fact. See supra notes 70-75 and accompa-
nying text. The last part of the penultimate sentence of the court's supplemental find-
ings seem to contain its conclusion of law: "[A]nd thereupon the court overruled the said 
motion upon the ground that taking the amnesty oath, as aforesaid, relieved him of any 
chance of disloyalty on account of him having become security as aforesaid . . . " Supple-
mental Findings of the Court of Claims at 2. 
The potential importance of Klein's disloyalty in fact was insured with the passage 
of the 1870 Act. In December, 1870 Klein's attorneys stipulated to his having been dis-
loyal (a surety), apparently content to rest primarily on pardon-based arguments. Sup-
plemental Findings of the Court of Claims at 2. While the form of the Supplemental 
Findings is confusing, the above seems the best explanation. Certainly as indicated 
above, the Supreme Court opinion views such facts as having been stipulated. 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) at 142. 
Finally, it should be noted that even if there had been no stipulation in Klein, if 
disloyalty had been determined based upon the Court of Claims finding that Klein had 
become a surety, the finding would have been logically independent of the 1870 Act. The 
1870 Act would have been employed to determine disloyalty only if the Court of Claims 
had conclusively presumed disloyalty based upon its finding that the claimant did not 
protest his innocence at the time he received a pardon. 
225. Federal Firearms Act, ch. 150, § 2(0. 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938). 
HeinOnline -- 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1238 1981
1238 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
gressional attempt to interfere with the Court's evidentiary or 
fact-finding processes. 226 
2. POSSIBLE HOLDINGS LIMITING CONGRESS' POWER TO REVISE 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS: HEREIN THE SIOUX NATION CASE 
a. The changed law rule 
The following discussion of the 1870 Act appears in Justice 
Chase's opinion in Klein: 
What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause 
in a particular way? In the case before us, the Court of Claims 
has rendered judgment for the claimant and an appeal has 
been taken to this court. We are directed to dismiss the appeal, 
if we find that the judgment must be affirmed, because of a 
pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants. Can we do so 
without allowing one party to the controversy to decide it in 
its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that the legisla-
ture may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Depart-
ment of the government in cases pending before it? 
We think not; and thus thinking, we do not at all question 
what was decided in the case of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling 
Bridge Co. . . . . No arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed 
in that case . . . .117 
It is impossible to know whether Chase and those who 
joined in his opinion took such passages seriously as reasons for 
invalidating the 1870 Act. It is possible that such language con-
tains some of the real grounds for the decision, and so it is im-
portant to determine more precisely to what extent the court 
was influenced by the fact that the 1870 Act was enacted after 
the judgment of the trial court. 
The possibility has been raised in other commentary that 
the Court in Klein invalidated the 1870 Act because the act re-
quired the Supreme Court to apply, to a case on appeal, a law 
226. Neither of Klein's companion cases-Pargoud and Armstrong-may be said 
to involve such a holding. In Pargoud a Court of Claims judgment against a claimant was 
reversed. There, as in Klein, the claimant had conceded disloyalty. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 
156. As in Klein, the Court in Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872), 
did not use the 1870 Act as a basis to find facts. In Armstrong, the Court of Claims did 
find the fact of disloyalty. 5 Ct. Cl. 623, 626 (1870). These ultimate facts of disloyalty 
were, however, found before the passage of the 1870 Act (Records, Armstrong, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 154, at 3-4) and in any event were based upon a finding that the claimant had 
in fact done certain acts; it was not based upon his having failed to protest a pardon. 5 
Ct. Cl. at 626. 
227. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47 (emphasis added). 
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enacted subsequent to the judgment of the trial court.128 If one 
takes this view, the Chase Court recognized a constitutional 
right of a successful litigant to retain the judgment of a federal 
constitutional court as long as that judgment was not erroneous 
when entered. 
Certainly there is language in Klein suggesting this possibil-
ity: "Can we do so [rule in favor of the government] without 
allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to 
the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending 
before it?"229 In addition, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge,180 
referred to by Chase above181 and distinguished by him was a 
case in which, in some sense, the effect of a judgment of the 
Supreme Court was changed by subsequent legislation.182 In 
Wheeling Bridge Pennsylvania attempted to abate the bridge as 
a nuisance under federal law despite a federal statute which de-
clared that the bridge was not a nuisance.188 The State's argu-
ment was that, in an earlier case before the passage of the stat-
ute, it had won a Supreme Court judgment that the bridge was a 
nuisance under federal law.18" The State asked the Supreme 
Court to strike down the statute on the ground that it annulled 
the judgment of that Court in the earlier case.2811 The Court 
agreed that Congress generally was not free to annul its judg-
ments but found an exception where the new law affected public 
as opposed to private rights.286 Chase's citation of Wheeling 
Bridge strongly suggests that he was concerned with the 1870 
Act's effect upon a pre-existing judgment of a federal court. 287 
228. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 316 n.4 (raising but rejecting this reading 
of Klein). 
229. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. 
230. Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmoni Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 
(1855). 
231. The quotation appears supra in the text accompanying note 227. 
232. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431-32. 
233. ld. at 429-32. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 431. 
236. ld. 
237. It is worth noting that Wheeling Bridge, unlike Klein, involved a change in 
the law to be applied to a case after the completion of the appellate process. It is also 
worth noting that the federal government was not a party in Wheeling Bridge. In Klein, 
the 1870 Act was enacted after the Court of Claims judgment and before the Supreme 
Court's disposition of the appeal. In Wheeling Bridge the Supreme Court considered 
legislation which had the practical effect of annulling one of its earlier judgments. The 
fact that the legislation considered in the second Wheeling Bridge case was enacted after 
the end of the appellate process in the first case makes Wheeling Bridge a stronger case 
for a finding of unconstitutionality. Chase may be saying that the principle recognized, 
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On the basis of a line of cases beginning in 1801 and ending 
with the decision in Klein,238 the authors of Hart & Wechsler's 
Federal Courts and the Federal System reject an interpretation 
of Klein which is based on the congressional destruction of judg-
ments. 239 These cases support the proposition that an appellate 
court must apply the law which exists at the time of appeal re-
gardless of whether doing so requires the reversal of a judgment 
valid when entered240 (I will refer to this proposition as the 
Changed Law Rule). Of course, a law enacted after judgment in 
a trial court may be independently unconstitutional for the 
usual variety of reasons. For example, its substance might con-
flict with a provision of the Bill of Rights. The Changed Law 
Rule establishes that Congress may require a new and otherwise 
valid law to apply to pending appeals without violating the 
Constitution. 
I agree with the authors of Hart & Wechsler's. Federal 
Courts and the Federal System. Despite some language in Klein 
which suggests a general repudiation of the Changed Law Rule, 
that Rule was well established at the time Klein was decided. 
Consequently it is unlikely that the Changed Law Rule was re-
jected in Klein. According to the Changed Law Rule, if Congress 
had been free, prior to judgment, to prescribe a rule of non-con-
sent to suits against the government, it was free to change a rule 
of consent to a rule of non-consent during the pendency of the 
appeal. Therefore, if the 1870 Act had been otherwise sound, the 
Act could have been applied on appeal to reverse a judgment 
which had been rendered before its enactment. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that Chase would invalidate the 1870 Act on the ground 
that it required the reversal of a lower court's decision, even 
though that decision was sound when made. 
One further possibility must be considered. Chase argued 
but not applied, in Wheeling Bridge also protects lower court judgments from revision 
unless revision is justified. Revision was justified in Wheeling Bridge but not in Klein 
where the revision was arbitrary and not necessary to the government's function as a 
regulator. This is a possible interpretation of Chase's statements. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 
146-47. 
238. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 316 n.4. Hart & Wechsler cites only 
Schooner Peggy up to the time of Klein. ld. The following cases, however, do support 
the general acceptance of the Changed Law Rule before the Klein decision: United 
States v. Preston, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 56, 65-66 (1830) (arguably limited to admiralty); 
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 632 (1813) (the context is a 
change in law effected by treaty, but the statement is general). For a case shortly after 
Klein, see Pugh v. McCormick, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 361, 372-74 (1872). 
239. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 316 n.4. 
240. See cases cited in supra note 238. 
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against the application of the 1870 Act to Klein because such an 
application would allow "one party to [a] controversy to decide 
it in its own favor."241 If Klein cannot be read as a general repu-
diation of the Changed Law Rule, it might be read as creating 
an exception to that Rule. Perhaps Chase saw the Changed Law 
Rule-which generally permits Congress to change the law 
which is applicable to a pending appeal-as not permitting a 
change which would relieve the government of an unfavorable 
judgment. This would explain Chase's apparent concern with 
congressional destruction of judgments-a concern which is evi-
denced by the distinctions he makes between Klein and Wheel-
ing Bridge.242 At the same time, such an exception is compatible 
with the existence of the Changed Law Rule as a general pro-
position. Indeed, Chase distinguished Wheeling Bridge by not-
ing that it involved "no arbitrary rule of decision."243 This 
phrase comes not long after Chase's expressed concern that the 
1870 Act would allow "one party to a controversy to decide it in 
its own favor."244 
This portion of Chase's opinion suggests the possibility that 
Chase believed that the Constitution prohibited Congress from 
destroying a federal court judgment which was previously ren-
dered against the federal government. Indeed one could concede 
to the legislature the power to change the law governing an ap-
peal in cases where the legislature acts as a regulator, i.e., where 
it is seeking prospective relief, but deny the legislature that 
power where the case involves a contest over property. While 
this distinction between two government roles may collapse if 
put under pressure, Chase might well have entertained it.2411 
241. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. 
242. Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 
(1855); see supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
243. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. 
244. /d. 
245. Cf. Hodges v. Snyder 261 U.S. 600, 603-04 (1923) (citing Klein). In Hodges, a 
taxpayer had been awarded an injunction and costs in a suit which challenged a school 
district in state court and under state law. The state's highest court had approved the 
injunction before an earlier remand. In a second appeal before the state's highest court, 
that court applied a new state statute which legitimated the district. It affirmed the 
judgment as to costs but, based upon the new statute, it reversed as to the injunction. 
The original plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming the new 
statute violated his due process rights by destroying his previous judgment. The Su-
preme Court said: 
(Appellants] sole contention is that as the curative act was not enacted until 
after the [state] Supreme Court had decided, on the first appeal, the consolidated 
district was invalid, and did not go into effect until after the Circuit Court had 
entered judgment adjudging its invalidity and enjoining the defendants from fur-
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This narrower view of Klein's possible prohibition is consistent 
ther conducting its affairs, it deprived them, as applied by the (state] Supreme 
Court, without due process, of the private property rights which had been vested in 
them under these adjudications. 
It is true that, as they contend the private rights of parties which have been 
vested by the judgment of a court cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation, 
but must be thereafter enforced by the court regardless of such legislation. Pennsyl-
vania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 429; The Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. 454, 
463; United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 146; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 
102, 124 (in which the repealing act was passed after judgment by the trial court). 
This rule, however, as held in the Wheeling Bridge Case, does not apply to a 
suit brought for the enforcement of a public right, which, even after it has been 
established by the judgment of the court, may be annulled by subsequent legislation 
and should not be thereafter enforced; although, in so far as a private right has been 
incidentally established by such judgment, as for special damages to the plaintiff or 
for his costs, it may not be thus taken away. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 
supra, pp. 431, 439. This case has been cited with approval in The Clinton Bridge, 
supra, p. 463 (likewise involving a public, as distinguished from a private, right of 
action), United States v. Klein .... 
261 U.S. at 603-04. 
Hodges of course raises somewhat different issues from those under discussion. First, 
a state and not the federal government is a party. The rule that is of interest to us 
prohibits the revision of federal court judgments against the United States based on 
article III, as opposed to due process grounds. Thus, an appeal from a state court in 
which the federal government is not a party is not pertinent. Second, Hodges involves 
the arguably more serious matter of revising a judgment after the time for appeal has 
lapsed, as opposed to the question of the validity of a change in the law pending appeal. 
While of course the Jaw changed before the appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 
the state law issue of validity of the school district had been finally decided by the 
highest court which could decide that issue. 
Despite these differences, Hodges suggests that destruction of judgments must be 
permitted to the extent that the legislature feels it necessary to protect "public rights." 
The Supreme Court in Hodges intimates that the state legislature could not have af-
- fected the state courts' award of costs against the school district because those are pri-
vate rights incidentally vested by judgment. 261 U.S. at 603-04. This in turn suggests 
that a judgment which is correct when rendered can create a private right good against a 
governmental entity even before the appellate process has concluded. If this is true of 
judgments of lower federal courts, is it the result of constitutional protection of property 
alone? Or are correct-when-rendered private-right judgements accorded the status of 
property at least partially in order to protect the role of the federal courts? One might 
explain the Supreme Court's statements about the judgment for costs in Hodges on the 
ground that it had been affirmed by the state's highest court before the first remand. 
Arguably the state-law appellate process had been concluded-at least as to the issue of 
costs. Consequently, Hodges involves the more serious problem of post-appeal revision of 
a judgment. It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court in Hodges cites 
Klein as precedent for the protection of judgments. In Klein the attempted revision oc-
curred during the appellate process. Unless the Court in Hodges misunderstood that 
fact, it saw Klein as protecting at least some correct-when-rendered trial court judg-
ments from legislative revision during the appellate process. 
Note again that this interpretation which forbids the destruction of judgments based 
on private rights is not necessarily present in Klein. Chase stated that Wilson had never 
lost his property rights so, arguably, the favorable Court of Claims judgment was not 
necessary to Klein's favorable judgment in the Supreme Court. By this I mean that if 
Klein had lost in the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court would have reversed unless it 
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with the Wheeling Bridge case. In short, it allows the govern-
ment to change the law in a case where it is a party acting as 
regulator but not where it is a party disputing property rights or 
money liability. In a rough sense, one might say the issue is 
whether the government is a party in a purely governmental ca-
pacity or in a proprietary capacity.248 I have found no cases up 
to the time of the Klein decision in which the Changed Law 
Rule was applied to permit reversal of a decision against the 
government. Indeed, if we restrict the issue to suits involving 
claims for money or title to property there are very few, if any, 
such cases during the 110 year period from Klein to date.247 
had viewed itself as deprived of jurisdiction. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
However, it is possible that the 1870 Act was struck down at least in part on the grounds 
that the Act would destroy a judgment of the Court of Claims. 
If indeed a judgment against the government is viewed as a vested right except 
where the government acts in a regulatory capacity, the very difficult question of when 
the government acts in a regulatory capacity remains. If legislation which increases pub-
lic wealth is per se regulatory, the distinction between cases in which the government is a 
regulator and those in which it is a property seeker collapses. The government could 
then avoid any judgment unless the legislation which changed the judgment was invalid 
according to constitutional principles independent of those protecting judgments. 
See the. cases cited in infra note 247 in which Congress validated, nunc pro tunc, 
taxes invalidly collected by a federally protected territory. Assuming the federal govern-
ment to be the real party in interest in those cases, is the federal government enforcing a 
new public regulation or is it involved in a property contest? If it is the former and if one 
ignores all the other reasons supporting Klein-including the poBBibility that the 1870 
Act was an ex post facto law-how is Klein different? As should be apparent, if Chase 
intended to establish a rule against changing the law to favor the government, that posi-
tion ultimately leads to difficult questions about permitting the government to regulate 
and, assuming an exception for regulation, to the further difficult problem of defining the 
border between that which is regulation and that which is not. This difficulty is inherent 
in a long line of analogous cases which purport to recognize protection against govern-
ment destruction for private, but not public, rights. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22~ 
50-51 (1932) (recognizing the distinction but finding it irrelevant to the issue under con-
sideration); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272, 284 (1855). In the Crowell and Murray's Lessee context the distinction between 
private and public rights is difficult to make at the borderline. See also Young, Federal 
Courts & Federal Rights, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1145 (1979) (illustrating the collapse at 
the border of the distinction between suits at common law and administrative proceed-
ings when Congress chose to metamorphose one into the other). 
The point is that the difficulty of distinguishing government regulation of public 
rights from disputes over private rights - the potential collapse of such a distinction 
under pressure - does not keep it from being used by and perhaps useful to courts 
which continue to observe it. This is as true today as it was true when Chase wrote 
Klein. Therefore, the ultimate difficulties with a rule which prohibits the changing of the 
law in some appellate contexts should not preclude the possibility that Chase intended 
such a rule. 
246. For a discussion of the problem with such a distinction, see supra note 245 
and accompanying text. 
247. In the following cases an act of Congress was held to validate tax collection by 
or for the territorial government of the Phillipines. In each case the act was applied to 
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At first blush, then, one can make a respectable case for 
Klein's recognition of an exception to the Changed Law Rule for 
new laws from which the government would benefit as a party to 
a lawsuit in a proprietary context. Indeed, one could plausibly 
distinguish the few possibly contrary cases in this century and 
argue for the current viability of such an exception. Klein is ar-
guably the main precedent for both the historical and the cur-
rent law argument. If such an exception exists, or at least ex-
isted, what is its origin? What constitutional justification could 
the Court have had for devising such an exception to the 
Changed Law Rule? 
First, it is important to note that the Supreme Court may 
well have made its decisions with no basis other than its own 
view of natural law. 248 Another possible justification is rooted in 
the earliest separation of powers principle which prohibits or at 
least discourages non-judicial revision of federal courts' 
judgments. 
b. Changing the law to favor the government on appeal and 
the rule against congressional revision of federal courts' 
judgments 
(1) The case law background: Gordon v. United States 
What follows demonstrates that Chase might well have ex-
tended preexisting constitutional principles in order to rule in 
Klein that the government cannot change the law to favor itself 
on appeal. 
In 1864, in Gordon v. United States,248 the Supreme Court 
refused to hear an appeal from a judgment of the Court of 
Claims although it was apparently required by statute to do 
so. 260 The basis for its refusal was the Court's conclusion that 
require reversal of the trial court decision which, prior to such legislation, had found the 
tax invalid. Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U.S. 226 (1921); and United States v. 
Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907). In a number of cases in the 1940's the federal 
government, while not a party, seems to have benefited from the reversal, under a new 
law, of a judgment rendered in favor of an employee and against an employer with whom 
the government had a "cost plus" contract. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 
176 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1949). 
248. See Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863), where the Court's re-
fusal to follow the apparently applicable state law based solely upon its view that doing 
so would "immolate truth, justice and the law" ld. at 206. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 
26, at 935-40. 
249. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864) (Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court was 
lost at the time of decision and published later at 117 U.S. 697 (1886)). 
250. 117 U.S. at 698-706. 
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the Court of Claims had not acted in a judicial manner when it 
rendered the judgment. 2111 The Court of Claims had not acted in 
a judicial manner because, by statute, the Treasury Department 
was forbidden to pay the Court of Claims judgments until the 
head of that department approved them. 2112 No decision can be 
judicial if it is susceptible · to modification by the executive 
branch. Since the Court of Claims had not behaved as a judicial 
body in rendering the judgment, review of such a judgment was 
not within the judicial power and was, therefore, outside of the 
constitutionally permissible appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court.2113 Two years later when Congress removed the 
Treasury Secretary's revisory authority,2114 the Supreme Court in 
De Groot v. United States 21111 resumed hearing appeals from the 
Court of Claims. 2116 
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Gordon was not the first to 
disapprove of non-judicial power to revise the judgments of fed-
eral courts. 2117 The opinion in Gordon was lost and not published 
until long after the Klein decision. 2118 It is to this day the most 
comprehensive treatment, in a Supreme Court opinion, of such 
revisory power. The Gordon opinion provides at least some indi-
cation of what a mid-nineteenth century Supreme Court Justice 
might have considered constitutionally defective in a scheme 
which permitted non-judicial revision of the federal courts' judg-
ments. In fact, although Taney's opinion was lost, his arguments 
were known to his colleagues, many of whom served on the 
Chase Court. 
Taney's opinion is based upon the separation of powers doc-
trine, an immanent rather than express constitutional doctrine. I 
believe it is possible to see two distinct but overlapping separa-
tion of powers arguments in Taney's rambling statements. The 
first argument is a basic separation of powers argument based on 
the independence of the judiciary.2119 This argument may be de-
scribed as follows. There are three distinct branches of the fed-
eral government. The Constitution's legislative history and its 
structure require those branches to be independent of each other 
251. ld. at 699-706. 
252. ld. at 698-99. 
253. ld. at 702-06. 
254. Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, § 1, 14 Stat. 9 (1886). 
255. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1866). 
256. See also Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 706 n• (1886). 
257. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
258. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1886). 
259. Id. at 699-700. 
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except where, by the design of the checks and balances system, 
they are permitted mutual interference. Any other interference, 
no matter how harmless it appears on the surface, ought to be 
forbidden on prophylactic grounds. Such uninvited interference 
might cause harm in tangible ways which are not immediately 
apparent, or it might invite further and more harmful tamper-
ing. Finally, such interference might symbolically weaken the af-
fected branch, causing it to lose the respect of the other 
branches and of the people. 
While Taney and other Justices have surely held views re-
sembling that outlined above, there are suggestions in the 
Gordon opinion, and in subsequent Supreme Court opinions, of 
a more specific but overlapping argument against non-judicial 
revision. In Gordon, Taney complains that the Court of Claims 
judgment's non-judicial nature stems from the fact that the 
judgment has no force until triggered by another branch: 
The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of 
every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It 
is no judgment, in legal sense of the term, without it. Without 
such an award the judgment would be inoperative and nuga-
tory . . . merely an opinion . . . . Such is not the judicial 
power .... 280 
(2) How Gordon may have been extended in Klein 
What is most interesting about Taney's specific concern 
with the effect of judgments is his view that non-judicial revision 
may result in a court's having issued "merely an opinion." In 
other words, one, but by no means the sole, defect of non-judi-
cial revision is that it results in a court's having done something 
akin to issuing an advisory opinion. It may be that this specific 
concern is directly related to the more general one already dis-
cussed: that advisory opinions are symbolically inconsistent with 
separation of powers principles.261 However, there is another way 
in which requiring the judiciary to issue advisory opinions 
threatens it as a separate branch of government: such opinions 
can divert courts from their primary function of finally deciding 
controversies by keeping them busy with matters of no 
consequence. 
There are some problems, however, with viewing a rejection 
260. ld. at 702 (emphasis added). 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59. 
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of the Changed Law Rule (in cases where the government bene-
fits as a party) as based upon a concern with advisory opinions. 
The first problem is that acceptance of the Changed Law Rule 
does not result in an advisory opinion. Opinions reversed as a 
result of a change in law on appeal were not advisory: they were 
fully effective when issued/162 This objection is muted somewhat 
by the realization that such opinions and advisory opinions are 
similar. They are members of a common class-opinions which 
prove to have been unnecessary. The second objection is this: 
the hypothesis that the Constitution prohibits federal courts 
from issuing opinions which may prove unnecessary is clearly 
false. Any opinion ultimately may prove to have been unneces-
sary as a result of a wide variety of circumstances including the 
winning party's decision to ignore it. Despite some contrary indi-
cations, the case law clearly accepts the Changed Law Rule and, 
with it, the validity of requiring federal courts to issue opinions 
which may later prove to have been unnecessary.luls 
Nevertheless, unnecessary non-advisory opinions do cause 
harm similar to that caused by advisory opinions. Each involves 
a court's having deliberated in some sense unnecessarily. While 
it is not feasible to avoid unnecessary opinions entirely, it may 
be that certain dangerous and easily avoidable instances of un-
necessary opinions can be identified and should be prohibited. 
Arguably, advisory opinions form one class of prohibited unnec-
essary opinion. A second type of unnecessary prohibited opinion 
may arise if, by means of a new law, the government changes a 
decision that is unfavorable to its interests. 
In order to argue that the Changed Law Rule creates a risk 
that an opinion will prove unnecessary-a risk which is generally 
acceptable except where the government is the beneficiary of the 
change-one must undertake the burden of explaining why the 
government's dual role is important. The government might be 
262. A non-advisory judicial opinion is one in support of a judgment which changes 
the legal relationship of the parties in ways that may or may not make some practical 
difference, depending upon future events. An advisory opinion is not connected with a 
judgment in this way. Even judgments dismissing an action (whether on the merits or for 
lack of jurisdiction) and even declaratory judgments have this potential effect of chang-
ing the legal relationship of the parties. Ordinarily such judgments have a res judicata 
effect with respect to issues decided and collateral estoppel effect as to facts necessarily 
determined in order to reach the decision. Consequently, after any judicial decision the 
parties stand in a different legal relationship with respect to possible future litigation. By 
contrast, after an advisory opinion the parties' legal rights remain unaltered. 
263. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Pope 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944). 
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more tempted to change the law where it benefits directly as a 
party to a lawsuit. It seems fanciful, however, to assert that such 
increased temptation should cause the concern that courts will 
be overburdened with work which will prove to have been done 
unnecessarily. 
Indeed, it seems that only the most general separation of 
powers principles could adequately explain an exception to the 
Changed Law Rule. Even if the specific argument that courts 
might be overburdened with ultimately useless work were more 
convincing, one would still need to explain why we should be 
concerned with Congress' overburdening lower federal courts it 
need not have created at all264 or a Supreme Court whose appel-
late jurisdiction it can greatly limit.2611 
For those who agree with Henry Hart that, as a practical 
matter, a government needs courts to legitimate certain of its 
activities, an explanation may be as follows.266 To abolish courts 
or, even less drastically, to have no court open to suits against 
the government, sends a clear signal to the electorate that Con-
gress has not chosen to exercise its constitutional option of sub-
jecting certain of its actions to'judicial scrutiny. Permitting Con-
gress to create such courts, but to ignore their judgments, 
involves a congressional choice of unaccountability whic~ is 
more complicated and, hence, less easily understood by the elec-
torate. As a result, it is more difficult to correct at the polls. 
When Congress acts as a regulator of public rights, it may need 
to change the rules governing a pending case on a rationale simi-
lar to that relied on by the Court in the Wheeling Bridge case. 
On the other hand when the contest involves claims to money or 
property, such justification may not be present. Particularly in 
cases like Klein, where, arguably, the government has a sover-
eign immunity privilege that allows it to avoid a constitutional 
attack, to permit the government to change the law because of 
some dissatisfaction with the result in pending cases would be to 
allow the government to hedge its bets from the start. Congress 
can open its courts to claims against the government hoping for 
a favorable resolution. If it wins, it wins twice; once with the 
favorable verdict, and second by the fact that the government 
appears to have subjected itself to the rule of law. If the govern-
ment loses, it loses once; it can change the law on appeal. In-
264. See supra text accompanying notes 147, 148. 
265. See supra text accompanying notes 146, 156. 
266. Cf. HART, supra note 23, at 1370-71. 
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deed, it may not even lose an appearance of accountability if its 
refusals to abide by judgments are few. Perhaps a prohibition 
against Congress' changing the law on appeal, to favor the gov-
ernment, rests on a judgment that the judicial branch ought not 
participate in Congress' giving the false impression that it has 
opened the government to judicial scrutiny. If so, a prohibition 
against changing the law on appeal to favor the government is 
one which increases legislative accountability, by requiring that 
Congress either clearly open or clearly close the courts to certain 
claims. 
With the assistance of this analysis, we can see that Chase's 
apparent concern with the government's power to change the 
law to favor itself is an intelligible constitutional argument that 
does not call into question the general validity of the Changed 
Law Rule. Indeed, such a view of Klein is compatible with a 
number of federal court opinions, including that of a majority of 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux Nation of 
Indians.267 
(3) Sioux Nation and Klein 
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has con-
sid~red striking down an act of Congress using Klein is United 
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians.268 In a 1942 case, the Court 
of Claims had ruled against the Sioux Nation's claim for interest 
which was founded upon allegations of the unlawful taking of 
the Sioux Nation's land without compensation.269 In 1974 the 
Sioux Nation obtained a decision of the Indian Claims Commis-
sion holding that the Federal Government had taken the Sioux 
Nation's land.270 The Commission concluded that the 1942 
Court of Claims decision was based upon lack of jurisdiction and 
was not based upon the fuerits.271 As a consequence the Com-
mission did not treat the Sioux Nation's claim as barred by that 
decision. 272 The government appealed from the Commission's 
ruling to the Court of Claims which, in 1975, held the Sioux Na-
tion's claim was barred by res judicata.278 In 1978 Congress en-
267. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
268. Id. 
269. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 789 
(1943); see also 448 U.S. at 384. 
270. 448 U.S. at 385-86. 
271. /d. 
272. /d. 
273. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 518 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 
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acted a law which provided for Court of Claims review of the 
1974 Commission decision "without regard to the defense of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel .... "274 Thus, Congress gave the 
Sioux Nation a second chance. In affirming2711 the Indian Claims 
Commission's award for interest owed as a result of the taking, 
the Court of Claims apparently had no difficulty with the statute 
which required relitigation of the taking issue. 278 In the Supreme 
Court, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist seriously considered 
the possibility that the statute requiring relitigation in Sioux 
Nation ran afoul of separation of powers principles established 
by Klein. 277 Justice Blackmun concluded for the court, after an 
analysis of Klein and other cases similar to Sioux Nation, that 
the statute was valid. 278 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, main-
tained that Klein was an obstacle to such congressionally man-
dated relitigation. 279 
Sioux Nation is the latest of a series of cases in which the 
Supreme Court has considered what bearing Klein has upon the 
validity of federal statutes which in some sense require the relit-
igation of cases otherwise finally decided by the federal courts.180 
In each of these cases, Congress arguably has abjured, by stat-
ute, the federal government's defense of res judicata. 281 In each 
case Congress required the Court of Claims to reconsider, after 
the time for appeal had expired, a case won · by the 
government. 2u 
In 1944, in Pope v. United States,288 the Court of Claims, 
citing Klein, held that a statute was unconstitutional.184 The 
plaintiff in Pope had won a judgment in an earlier case in the 
Court of Claims.1811 The judgment, however, disallowed compen-
274. Act of March 13, 1978, Pub: L. No. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978). 
275. Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 
276. All three opinions, including the dissent, assume the validity of the 1978 stat-
ute sub silentio, and proceed to deal with the merits of the case. I d. 
277. 448 U.S. at 391-407, 427-34. 
278. ld. at 407. 
279. 448 U.S. at 430-31. 
280. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Pope v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944); Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 476 (1926); Nock v. 
United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 451 (1867). See also the cases collected in United States v. Sioux 
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 398 n.24. 
281. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 476, 486 (1926); Nock v. 
United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 451, 458 (1867). 
282. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 476, 486 (1926); Nock v. 
United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 451, 455-58 (1867). 
283. 100 Ct. Cl. 375 (1944). 
284. Id. at 380-88. 
285. Id. at 377. 
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sation for certain work.288 The statute which was held unconsti-
tutional in Pope required payment for the work which was held 
non-compensible by the prior judgment, and it left only minor 
computational duties to the Court of Claims.287 Citing Klein, the 
Court of Claims in Pope invalidated the statute because it con-
ferred jurisdiction upon the court but left the court without any 
substantial judicial function. 288 The court also suggested the 
possibility that Klein would prohibit congressionally compelled 
relitigation even where the Court otherwise was permitted to 
function normally.289 
The Supreme Court reversed,290 holding that the statute in 
question created a new legal liability to satisfy an old moral obli-
gation.291 Since the source of the right was new, the earlier pro-
ceeding did not constitute a res judicata bar.292 As for the asser-
tion that the Court of Claims was left with no judicial function, 
the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that courts often have lit-
tle to do in cases where the law is clear and the facts are stipu-
lated, or where judgment is rendered upon consent or upon the . 
default of one of the parties.298 The Supreme Court in Pope, 
however, did leave open the possibility that Klein might apply 
in an arguably different case: 
We do not consider just what application the principles an-
nounced in the Klein case could rightly be given to a case in 
which Congress sought, pendente lite, to set aside a judgment 
of the Court of Claims in favor of the Government and to re-
quire relitigation of the suit . . . .194 · 
In Sioux Nation Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, felt the 
Supreme Court had before it just such a case of unconstitu-
tional, congressionally compelled r.elitigation.2911 Indeed, the stat-
ute at issue in Sioux Nation on its face did require the relitiga-
tion of a case decided in favor of the government many years 
earlier.298 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun conceded 
286. ld. at 377-88; see also 323 U.S. at 5-8. 
287. 100 Ct. Cl. at 377-88. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. Pope v. United States; 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944). 
291. Id. at 8-11. · 
292. Id. 
293. ld. at 12. 
294. I d. at 8-9. Presumably, setting aside a judgment post lite, as in Sioux Nation, 
would have been even more questionable. 
295. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 424-31. 
296. See Act of March 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978); United 
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that religitation was, in effect, the statute's object.:197 He consid-
ered two possible objections to the statute: (1) that it would 
render the Court of Claims' "earlier judgments ... merely advi-
sory opinions"298 and (2) citing Klein, that "Congress over-
stepped its bounds by granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction 
to decide the merits . . . while prescribing a rule for decision 
that left the Court no adjudicatory function to perform. "299 
In upholding the federal statute requiring relitigation, Jus-
tice Blackmun's primary argument was based upon earlier cases 
such as Cherokee Nation v. United States800 which permitted 
such relitigation.801 He did not deal specifically with the advi-
sory opinion argument which he raised at the outset. His argu-
ment seems to be a simple one: that such a relitigation does not 
transgress the rule against advisory opinions because the Su-
preme Court had already so held in Cherokee Nation. 802 
Justice Blackmun did, however, attempt to harmonize Cher-
okee Nation with Klein.808 He tried to explain their apparently 
different results by means of two distinctions: 
First, of obvious importance to the Klein holding was the 
fact that Congress was attempting to decide the controversy at 
issue in the Government's own favor. Thus, Congress' action 
[in Klein as opposed to Sioux Nation] could not be grounded 
upon its broad power to recognize and pay the Nation's debts. 
Second, and even more important, the proviso at issue in Klein 
had attempted to "prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause 
in a particular way . . . . The amendment at issue in the pre- · 
sent case, however, like the Special Act at issue in Cherokee 
Nation, waived the defense of res judicata so that a legal claim 
could be resolved on the merits. Congress made no effort in 
either instance to control the Court of Claims' ultimate deci-
sion of that claim . . . . 804 
This passage offers some support for the argument 
presented earlier that the government's power to change a law to 
favor itself is prohibited as an exception to the Changed Law 
Rule, and that Klein may have been based on such a 
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 389. 
297. 448 U.S. at 389. 
298. /d. at 391-92. 
299. /d. at 392. 
300. 270 u.s. 476 (1926). 
301. 448 U.S. at 395-97. 
302. /d. at 395-402. 
303. /d. at 405-07. 
304. /d. at 405 (emphasis added). 
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prohibition. soG 
Sioux Nation itself, however, involved the validity of a 
change in the law to favor the government's opponent. With re-
spect to that question, Blackmun's second distinction between 
Klein and Sioux Nation, that the Klein rule "prescribed a rule 
for the decision," seems to raise a straw issue and indeed one 
not germane to the issue of relitigation. Assuming arguendo that 
Congress can require relitigation, it can certainly prescribe a 
substantive result by means of any constitutionally valid statute. 
As Justice Blackmun ultimately conceded, Pope made that pro-
position clear long ago in holding that, in a wide variety of cases, 
courts are simply required to apply the law to established 
facts. 308 
Justice Blackmun's discussion of the first distinction be-
tween.Klein and Sioux Nation is apparently, although not ex-
pressly, designed to deal with the issue of relitigation. His dis-
tinction suggests that he was willing to view the statute in Sioux 
Nation as if it created a new statutory obligation. He was willing 
to view it that way even though on its face it did not create a 
new obligation, but rather required relitigation of once-settled 
issues. According to Blackmun, then, Congress has created a new 
obligation through its broad spending power. This must be his 
view, otherwise the spending power has no relevance to the issue 
of relitigation. His argument that the spending power permits 
"recognition" of debts is relevant to the issue of "relitigation" 
only as part of an argument that: (1) there is technically no relit-
igation because Congress has created a new obligation pursuant 
to the spending power and this new obligation is now the subject 
of litigation or (2) that since Congress, in effect, could have ac-
complished relitigation by creating a new obligation, it ought to 
be viewed as having done so. 
There is little real analysis in either Justice Rehnquist's or 
Justice Blackmun's opinion. Both argue only on the basis of pre-
cedent and the most generalized notion of separation of powers. 
Which position is right? Can the government require relitigation 
under such circumstances? If so, is it forced to resort to the form 
of creating an odd "new right", one conditioned on the outcome 
of a new trial of issues previously litigated? 
305. See supra text § IV(B)(2)(a). Justice Blackmun's point may be more limited 
however. He may simply question the government's power to intervene on behalf of itself 
once the time for appeal has expired. 
306. 448 U.S. at 407. 
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While Justice Blackmun's opinion rivals Chase's opinion in 
Klein for its lack of clarity, Blackmun's result seems right. Only 
according to the most symbolic, ultraprophylactic view of sepa-
ration of powers does relitigation under the circumstances in-
volved in Sioux Nation pose a threat to the independence of the 
judicial branch. 
First, even if one takes seriously the "advisory" or unneces-
sary opinion argument,307 there seems little likelihood that the 
government will abjure a large number of favorable judgments. 
In short, permitting relitigation under the circumstances of 
Sioux Nation will not result in a large number of Court of 
Claims' opinions having been issued in vain. 
Second, and more seriously, what of the separation of pow-
ers concern that Congress should not be permitted to appear to 
have subjected government action to judicial scrutiny when it 
has not? As we have already seen, this concern seems rooted in a 
further concern that Congress should not evade its moral re-
sponsibilities to be accountable in court. 308 While the act of Con-
gress considered in Klein seems to give cause for such concerns, 
those considered in Sioux Nation, Cherokee Nation and Pope 
have an opposite thrust. In the latter two cases Congress en-
larged the government's accountability for its moral obligations. 
There is no good reason to prohibit Congress from creating a 
new liability, by statute, to reflect what it considers to be an 
existing moral obligation. There seems to be no relevant general 
limitation upon Congress' power to condition its newly created 
liability upon a court's finding certain facts. Because these pro-
positions seem true, and because there is only a formal differ-
ence between the statute in Pope, which was adjudged to have 
created a new liability, and that in Sioux Nation which, it was 
held, required relitigation, the issue ought to be whether the dif-
ference in form reasonably bears on constitutional validity. As 
we have seen, the form of such a statute is irrelevant to all but 
the most symbolic of separation of powers concerns. Under such 
circumstances, it makes little sense to thwart a congressional 
will which can be effectively reasserted by the careful redrafting 
of a statute. 
C. Klein and the Status of the Court of Claims 
Today a distinction is recognized between the inferior fed-
307. See supra text accompanying notes 262-65. 
308. See supra text accompanying notes 266-67. 
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eral courts which, under article III of the Constitution, Congress 
"may from time to time ordain and establish" and other federal 
entities created by Congress to function judicially. 309 The former 
are called "constitutional" courts or "article Ill" courts.310 When 
Congress is found to have established such a court its judges en-
joy constitutionally guaranteed life tenure and undiminishable 
salaries. 311 The second sort of judicial body includes the judicial 
arms of administrative agencies and various bodies called courts 
but whose judges' tenure and salaries are within congressional 
control. 312 
At the time of the Klein decision, such a distinction had not 
fully emerged; indeed there is no indication that either Congress 
or the Supreme Court had by 1871 considered the possibility of 
the use of non-Article III courts outside of the territories.318 A 
number of statements in Chase's opinion, nevertheless, can be 
read as suggesting that the Court of Claims was a court in the 
article III sense, just as any other federal court. Recall that in 
1863, in Gordon v. United States, the Supreme Court refused to 
hear appeals from the Court of Claims on the grounds that the 
Secretary of the Treasury had statutory revisory power over the 
Court's judgments. 314 Recall also that in 1865 Congress repealed 
the Secretary's revisory authority and that, with De Groot v. 
United States, the Supreme Court resumed hearing appeals 
from the Court of Claims. 3111 In Klein, Chase, citing Gordon and 
the Treasury Secretary's revisory power, concedes ·that "origi-
nally [the Court of Claims) was a court merely in name."318 He 
then concludes, citing the repeal of the revisory authority and 
the De Groot case: "Since [the repeal of the revisory authority] 
the Court of Claims has exercised all the functions of a court 
. . . . The Court of Claims is thus constituted one of those infer-
ior courts which Congress authorizes . . . . "317 
In 1933, in Williams v. United States,318 the Supreme 
309. See Glidden Company v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1962). 
310. Id. at 534, 539. 
311. Id. at 533-34; see U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. 
312. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 533-34. 
313. For a discussion of the history of this distinction between article III courts 
and legislative courts, see id. at 544-48. 
314. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864). See supra text accompanying 
notes 249-53. 
315. See supra text accompanying notes 254-56. 
316. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144. 
317. ld. at 144-45. 
318. 289 u.s. 553 {1933). 
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Court, despite the suggestion in Klein to the contrary, held that 
the Court of Claims was not a constitutional court and that, 
therefore, its judge's salaries could be reduced. 319 Three decades 
later in Glidden v. Zdanok the Supreme Court concluded that 
the Court of Claims was a full-fledged Constitutional court.320 
The five justicesm who voted in favor of the Court's judgment 
in Glidden fell into two camps. Two Justices conceded the cor-
rectness of Williams but felt the court's status had been 
changed by Congress in the interim.m The other three Justices 
felt Williams had been wrongly decided. m The issue, in their 
opinion, was largely one of the intent of Congress. 324 Those Jus-
tices cited Chase's opinion in Klein, suggesting that the Court of 
Claims had been a full-fledged constitutional court at least as of 
the time that Congress repealed the Treasury Secretary's revi-
sory power. 3211 
The history of the Klein case bolsters the argument of those 
three Justices that the Court of Claims had become a constitu-
tional court, at least by the time the Treasury Secretary lost his 
revisory authority. Although it is not mentioned in any of the 
commentary on Klein, Klein was paid his $125,300 judgment af-
ter the Court of Claims decision was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court.326 
On the surface this seems surprising. During the debate that 
has occasionally raged over the constitutional court status of the 
Court of Claims,327 it has been noted that Congress has, from 
time to time, refused to provide funds to pay that court's judg-
319. Id. at 559-60, 581. 
320. 370 u.s. 530 (1962). 
321. Id. at 531, 585. 
322. Id. at 585. 
323. Id. at 531. 
324. Id. at 541-58. 
325. Id. at 568. 
326. Proof of payment can be found in the National Archives. It consists of (1) 
Treasury Department Settlement Warrant No. 260, dated February 14, 1872, authorizing 
the issuance of a draft, in the amount of $125,300, to John A. Klein as Victor F. Wilson's 
Administrator, to cover "return of proceeds of captures and abandoned property" and 
(2) the draft No. 7708 dated February 15, 1872, endorsed by John A. Klein and stamped 
"Paid March 4, 1872." Copies of these documents are on file in the offices of the Wiscon-
sin Law Review. 
327. For a description of the debate, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552-
58 (1962). Glidden summarized the Court of Claims' history including the Supreme 
Court's vacillations as to its status as a constitutional or legislative court. Id. at 552-58. 
Glidden itself overruled an earlier Supreme Court opinion and declared the Court of 
Claims to be a constitutional court. ld. at 562-68. Glidden is the Supreme Court's last 
pronouncement on the subject. 
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ments.328 Indeed, one Supreme Court Justice seems to have felt 
that the frequency with which Congress has refused to pay that 
court's judgments should provide at least some guidance a8 to 
the Court of Claims constitutional stature. 329 
The only study dealing with the frequency of nonpayment is 
a student Note in the Harvard Law Review which states that, 
while nonpayment has been infrequent, it has oc-
curred-perhaps as many as fifteen times by 1933.330 That Note 
has played a role in the development of the law dealing with the 
status of the Court of Claims. 331 While asserting that there have 
been fifteen instances of nonpayment of Court of Claims' judg-
ments, the Note cites only two instances, only one of which oc-
curred in the nineteenth century.332 It occurred just months af-
ter Klein's judgment was paid.888 In May 1872, this provision 
was appended to a law which, among other things, appropriated 
four hundred thousand dollars, for the next fiscal year, to pay 
judgments of the Court of Claims: "Provided: That no part of 
this sum shall be paid upon any judgment rendered in favor of 
George Chorpenning out of any service rendered in carrying the 
mail."834 It is this "instance of nonpayment," cited in the Note 
mentioned above, that raises questions about why no similar ef-
fort had been made to stop payment of Klein's judgment. Cer-
tainly Congress had gone to elaborate lengths to deprive Klein 
of hi's Court of Claims' judgment.8811 If Congress was willing, on 
occasion, to refuse to pay Court of Claims' judgments in the 
early 1870's, one would expect a refusal in Klein's case. 
Perhaps the Radical Republicans had not noticed that 
Klein had been decided by the Supreme Court. Klein's newspa-
per coverage was of the back page variety, 888 and a reading of 
the Congressional Globe for two months following the decision 
does not reveal a single reference to it. Yet there is a more in-
triguing possibility. Perhaps Congress in the 1870's did not be-
328. Note, The Court of Claims: Judicial Power and Congressional Review, 46 
HARV. L. REv. 677, 685-86 n.63 (1933). 
329. Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962). 
330. Note, supra note 328, at 685-86 n.63. 
331. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962). 
332. Note, supra note 328, at 685-86 n.63. 
333. The instance cited occurred in 1872. /d. (citing an Act of May 8, 1872, ch. 2, 
17 Stat. 61, 82 (1872)). Klein's judgment was paid on March 4, 1872 or as early as Febru-
ary 15, 1872 if delivery of a draft for that amount drawn on the U.S. Treasury is consid-
ered payment. See supra note 326. 
334. Act of May 8, 1872, ch. 2, 17 Stat. 61, 82 (1872). 
335. See supra text § II(B)(3). 
336. The Daily Nat'l Republican, Jan. 30, 1872, at 4, col. 5. 
HeinOnline -- 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1258 1981
1258 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
lieve it was proper for it to refuse to pay a judgment of the 
Court of Claims. Klein was decided only eight years after the 
Supreme Court's refusal in Gordon to hear appeals from the 
Court of Claims because of the Secretary's revisory authority. 337 
·Two years later, only six years before Klein, Congress had elimi-
nated that barrier to review by repealing the law which gave the 
Secretary revisory authority. 838 
Were it not for the Chorpenning proviso339 cited by the 
Harvard Note, one might speculate that not even the Radical 
Republicans would have wished to deprive Klein of his judgment 
at the cost of returning to the chaotic situation which prevailed 
after the Gordon case. In Gordon, the Supreme Court refused to 
hear an appeal from the Court of Claims because the latter's 
judgments were subject to executive branch revision. The Su-
preme Court persisted in this refusal until Congress repealed the 
executive's revisory powers. 340 By making a Court of Claims 
judgment subject to revision Congress might attempt to use the 
Supreme Court to undo a Court of Claims' judgment; if it suc-
ceeded, its action would have been adjudicated valid by a 
court-the Supreme Court. But, the argument continues, Con-
gress needed the legitimacy provided by the Court of Claims, 
and was cautious about exercising raw power to refuse to pay its 
judgments. In short, they feared a return to a view expressed in 
Gordon: that Congress only appeared to have made itself sub-
ject to suit in a court by providing a Court of Claims. 
The Chorpenning proviso, cited as involving an 1872 con-
gressional refusal to pay a Court of Claims judgment, may in 
fact be consistent with an argument that Congress was reluctant 
to render a Court of Claims' judgment a nullity. That proviso is 
not what it seems to be. Chorpenning had neither recovered a 
judgment in the Court of Claims at the time of the proviso nor 
did he at any later time. 341 Indeed, at the time of the proviso, 
. Chorpenning had no litigation pending, his appeal from the first 
Court of Claims decision had been dismissed and his second 
Court of Claims suit had not been filed. 342 The legislative history 
337. See supra text accompanying notes 249-53. 
338. See supra text accompanying notes 254-56. 
339. See supra note 334 and accompanying text and infra note 342 and accompa-
nying text. 
340. See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text. • 
341. See infra note 342. 
342. The index to the Court of Claims Reports 1863-90 (volumes 1-25) contains 
three entries under Chorpenning's name: 12 Ct. Cl. 110 (a reprint of 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 397 
(1876)); 11 Ct. Cl. 625 (1875); and 3 Ct. Cl. 140 (1867). These entries reflect two suits in 
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of the proviso is unfortunately murky. Even if one indulges in 
the Court of Claims. The first, reflected in 3 Ct. Cl. 140, was lost by Chorpenning in the 
Court of Claims. He appealed to the United States Supreme Court but later withdrew 
that appeal. The second suit, reflected in the 11 Ct. Cl. 625 decision of the Court of 
Claims against Chorpenning, was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 397 
(1876) (reprinted in 12 Ct. Cl. 110). The history of both suits is contained in the Su-
preme Court's opinion and the Record and Briefs in the second appeal. /d. In describing 
both suits I will occasionally refer to those two sources connected with the second appeal. 
The history of Chorpenning's litigation in the Court of Claims is complex. It arises out of 
his services as a mail carrier in the 1850's and early 1860's. 
In 1857 Congress passed a special bill for Chorpenning's relief "requir(ing)" the 
Postmaster General to "adjust and settle" the former's claim to compensation for ser-
vices rendered. Act of March 3, 1857, ch. 176, 11 Stat. 521 (1857) [hereinafter referred to 
as the 1857 Act]. In May of 1857 the Postmaster made an award to Chorpenning. 94 U.S. 
(4 Otto) 397. Chorpenning received the funds under protest and brought suit in the 
Court of Claims for additional compensation. /d. The Court of Claims found that the 
1857 Act authorized the Postmaster to act judicially or quasi-judicially and that the 
Postmaster was meant to have exclusive jurisdiction over Chorpenning's claim. 3 Ct .. Cl. 
at 147-49. As a result of this interpretation of the 1857 Act, the Court of Claims dis-
missed Chorpenning's petition. Id. at 149. He appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. 94 U.S. (4 Otto) at 398 (opinion in the second Chorpenning appeal discussing the 
first appeal). 
During the pendency of Chorpenning's appeal from his first loss in the Court of 
Claims, he attempted to obtain further redress from Congress with respect to the claim 
just mentioned and a new claim involving the loss of a mail route. Record in 94 U.S. (4 
Otto) 397 at 2-3. He succeeded. Congress appointed the Postmaster General to readjust 
the old claim and to adjust the new one. Act of July 15, 1870, J. Res. 142, 16 Stat. 673 
(1870). In December, 1870 the Postmaster made an award of approximately $443,oo0, 
roughly evenly divided between the old and new claims. 94 U.S. (4 Otto) at 398; Record 
at 5-22. · 
In early 1871 Congress reacted angrily to Chorpenning's new award. See CoNG. 
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Seas. 833-37 (1871), 1011-13 (Senate, February 1871). The prevail-
ing sentiment seemed to be that the 1870 Act requiring the new adjustment had been 
inadvertently drafted to result in an award of more than was truly owed Chorpenning. 
/d. Indeed it permitted an award of more than Chorpenning had claimed before the 
Congress. /d. at 834. In February, 1871 Congress repealed the legislation of 1870 which 
authorized the award. Act of February 9, 1871, J. Res. 26, 16 Stat. 702 (1871). Shortly 
thereafter, Congress attached riders to bills appropriating funds for the Post Office De-
partment providing that none of the funds appropriated could be used to compensate 
Chorpenning. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 115, 16 Stat. 515, 519, 571, 572. Presumably 
these Acts were designed to prohibit payment of the Postmaster General's award. 
In December of 1871, Chorpenning withdrew his appeal from his first loss in the 
Court of Claims. Record in Chorpenning v. United States, Case No.9 (December Term 
1871) (available in the National Archives and on file at the Wisconsin Law Review). The 
Chorpenning proviso cited in the Harvard Law Review Note, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 328-32, became law early the following year. Act of May 8, 1872, ch. 2, 17 Stat. 
61, 82 (1872). It was the only legislation connected with Chorpenning's claims which 
expressly forbade payment of a judgment of the Court of Claims. It was passed at a time 
when Chorpenning had lost his only case in the Court of Claims and had withdrawn his 
appeal. His second suit was not filed until 1875. Record in 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 397 at 1. 
Even if Congress acted in ignorance of Chorpenning's 1871 withdrawal of his appeal, the 
1872 Act is no more than advance warning to the Supreme Court that a judgment would 
not be paid if rendered in the future, i.e., if the Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Claims' decision against Chorpenning. Such advance warning is more in the nature of a 
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the alternative and plausible assumption that the proviso was an 
attempt to tell the Court of Claims that any judgment in a par-
ticular, future action would not be paid, the proviso more resem-
bles a repeal of consent to sue than a post-judgment non-pay-
ment. Perhaps the early history of the Court of Claims, after its 
metamorphosis in the 1860's, is more indicative of independence 
from Congress than has hitherto been believed. 
While much later, Congress on occasion refuseed to pay 
Court of Claims' judgments, the apparent acquiesence in the 
payment to Klein suggests a particular congressional view of the 
Court of Claims in 1872: that that court's judgments must be 
paid unless undone by a superior federal court. According to this 
view, the Congress in 1872 recognized that its predecessor Con-
gress, in repealing the Treasury Secretary's revisory power, had 
bought some legitimacy at the cost of creating a constitutional 
court which enjoyed immunity from congressional tampering. 
CONCLUSION 
Eleven decades of case law, scholarship and debate testify 
to Klein's great significance in relation to the separation of pow-
ers between the Congress and the federal judiciary. Klein's great 
and, I hope, enduring contribution is a byproduct of its holding 
unconstitutional a particular regulation of the federal courts' ju-
risdiction. As Salmon Chase declared, Congress had passed the 
"limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power." 
In so declaring, Chase legitimated the notion of a judicial check 
on Congress' abuse of its own check on the judiciary. 
The particular holding in Klein prohibits Congress from us-
ing its jurisdictional powers to manipulate federal courts so as to 
reach decisions which, if addressed in terms of substantive law, 
would be forbidden by the Constitution. In Klein the offending 
manipulation took the form of conferring jurisdiction upon the 
Supreme Court to decide an appeal but refusing it jurisdiction 
to apply the pardon provisions of the Constitution, whose appli-
withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction or of consent to sue the federal government, see 
supra text accompanying note 240-41, than a refusal to pay an extant judgment of the 
Court of Claims against the government. There was no such judgmen~; the only extant 
judgment favored the government and not the claimant. Compare Klein in which the 
claimant had won in the Court of Claims. See supra text § IV(B)(2)(b). 
Unfortunately the legislative history of the 1872 Act is obscured. Representative 
Dawes, who had lead the earlier attempt to undo the Postmaster General's award, at-
tached it to a bill appropriating money for the Court of Claims, and it was accepted 
without debate. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 628 (1872). 
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cation required affirmance of a lower court's decision against the 
government. 
Like Procrustes' unfortunate guests, Klein often has been 
stretched painfully. It has been invoked for propositions on 
which it has little bearing other than its establishment of the 
legitimacy of an inquiry into Congress' abuse of its power to reg-
ulate the federal courts. Contrary to assertions in a recent case, 
for example, Klein has little to say about the constitutionality of 
the Speedy Trial Act. Contrary to suggestions in legislative de-
bate, Klein has little bearing on the constitutionality of the re-
cent and regrettable proposals to remove jurisdiction from the 
federal courts in busing, abortion and school prayer cases.a.u 
The assertion that Klein contains a holding limiting con-
gressional regulation of judicial factfinding is also incorrect. Cer-
tainly some of the language of the Klein opinion may be read as 
reflecting a concern with such matters. Those statements, if so 
intended, are interesting, perhaps valuable, dicta, but they have 
no connection with the result in Klein's case, in which the evi-
dentiary features of the law struck down did not come into play. 
Klein continues to be of interest to the federal courts in 
cases where Congress has attempted to change the result of a 
federal court judgment-as in Sioux Nation. We have seen that, 
while the government is generally free to change the law which 
applies to pending appeals, one could make a colorable case that 
it is not free to reap the benefits of such a change if it is itself a 
party to the appeal. A fortiori, Congress would not be free to 
change a judgment rendered against the federal government af-
ter the time for appeal had lapsed. But what of cases like Pope 
and Sioux Nation where Congress attempts to give a second 
lawsuit to a party who lost to the government? No reasonable 
reading of Klein suggests that Congress should be denied the 
use of federal courts as judicial instruments for a second lawsuit 
generously provided to the government's party opponent. Addi-
tionally nothing in the circumstances of Pope or of Sioux Na-
tion, or of other similar cases indicates that a court was asked to 
function non-judicially. · 
While much has been read into Klein, some has been read 
out. One plain holding has apparently escaped the notice of the 
countless people who have had occasion to comment on the case. 
343. See, e.g., 128 CoNG. REc. 82251 (daily ed. March 17, 1982) (statements of Sen. 
Goldwater). For rebuttal, see id. at 82257 (statements of Charles E. Rice). This whole 
debate is replete with references to and descriptions of Klein. ld. at 82225-69. 
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Klein clearly holds that Congress' powers over sovereign immu-
nity matters were not sufficient to permit it to require the Su-
preme Court to reverse a lower court's award of a monetary rem-
edy against the United States. Read radically, Klein would 
support an argument that at least some part of the Court of 
Claims' jurisdiction becomes nonretractable, as a matter of con-
stitutional law, once it is given. Read more realistically, Klein 
recognizes antidiscrimination limits upon Congress' control of 
suits against the federal government. On this view there are 
some limits on Congress' ability to open the Court of Claims to 
suits by one class of claimants while closing it to another. By the 
time Chase wrote the Klein opinion, he had certainly been ex.:. 
posed to such an argument. 
Finally, Chase's statements in Klein concerning the status 
of the Court of Claims, together with the fact that Klein's judg-
ment was paid by the treasury, suggest that by 1872 that court 
had achieved full status as an inferior court of the United States 
ordained and established under the Constitution's Third 
Article. 344 
344. As this article went to press, Congress substantially restructured the claims 
court system. See Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-1164, 96 Stat. 
25 (1982). 
